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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________________________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge, joined by RESTREPO, Circuit 
Judge, who also joins in the Concurrence. 
Plaintiffs assert that they developed cancer1 after 
being exposed to excessive radiation emissions from the 
Nuclear Material and Equipment Company (“NUMEC”) 
facility in Apollo, Pennsylvania (the “Apollo facility”).  
Plaintiffs do not challenge the District Court’s 
conclusions that their common-law claims against 
                                           
 
1 For simplicity’s sake, we refer to the individuals 
diagnosed with cancer as “Plaintiffs” even though several 
of those individuals have died and the executors of those 
individuals’ estates have been substituted as plaintiffs.   
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Defendants2 were preempted by the Price-Anderson Act 
and that only their Price-Anderson “public liability” 
claims are at issue in this appeal.  Although the Price-
Anderson Act preempted Plaintiffs’ common-law 
negligence claims, Plaintiffs’ Price-Anderson public 
liability claims require Plaintiffs to prove versions of the 
traditional negligence elements—(1) duty, (2) breach, 
(3) causation, and (4) damages. 
The District Court held that Defendants were 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the 
Price-Anderson claims because Plaintiffs failed to show 
that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to 
elements of duty, breach, and damages.  Plaintiffs 
appealed.  We agree with the District Court:  Plaintiffs 
are missing critical elements, and therefore their claims 
fail. 
                                           
 
2 Defendants are Atlantic Richfield Company and 
Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Group, Inc., 
Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Group Inc., and 
B&W Technical Services Inc.  Atlantic Richfield 
Company and Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation 
Group, Inc., were owners of the NUMEC facility at 
different points in time.  See, e.g., JA1467 (stating that 
Atlantic Richfield bought the Apollo facility from 
NUMEC in 1967 and Babcock & Wilcox purchased the 
facility in 1971). 
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Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court.   
BACKGROUND 
I. THE PARTIES AND EMISSIONS 
A. The Parties 
Plaintiffs are more than seventy individuals3 in a 
group of consolidated cases who claim that excessive 
radiation emitted by Defendants—more specifically, 
radiation from uranium effluent from the Apollo 
facility—caused them to develop various cancers.   
Almost all of the Plaintiffs lived near Apollo, 
Pennsylvania, for many years, including the 1960s, and 
almost all of the Plaintiffs were diagnosed with at least 
one form of cancer between 2007 and 2011.4  The 
                                           
 
3 At oral argument, even Plaintiffs’ counsel was unable to 
fix the exact number of plaintiffs.  See Oral Arg. Tr. at 
4:6–19. 
4 This period of time when most Plaintiffs were 
diagnosed with cancer may reflect that another group of 
individuals who developed cancer had previously sued 
Babcock & Wilcox and Atlantic Richfield Co.  Their 
lawsuit apparently settled before trial.  See Docket, Hall 
v. Babcock & Wilcox, No. 94-951 (W.D. Pa.); see also 
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similarities among the Plaintiffs end there.  By our count, 
Plaintiffs alleged that they suffered from more than a 
dozen different types of cancer.5  Plaintiffs were of 
widely varying ages at the times of their diagnoses—with 
at least one individual under 30 and at least five 
individuals over 80.  See JA3460 (81); JA3478 (82); 
JA3479 (88); JA3482 (81); JA3485 (29); JA3491 (82).  
Many of the Plaintiffs had extensive smoking histories, 
and some had multiple cancer diagnoses over their 
lifetimes.  See, e.g., JA3474 (“smoked about half a pack 
per day for 40 years”); JA3463 (“diagnosed with breast 
cancer in 1986 and then again in 2008 at the age of 67”).   
                                                                                              
 
Hall v. Babcock & Wilcox, No. 94-951, 2007 WL 
1740852 (W.D. Pa. June 14, 2007).  The diagnosis date 
range here may also reflect statute of limitations 
concerns.  The statute of limitations is not an issue in this 
appeal.  
5 See, e.g., JA3447 (“Non Hodgkin’s Lymphoma”); 
JA3448 (“lung cancer”); JA3449 (“breast cancer”); 
JA3450 (“esophageal cancer”); JA3451 (“colorectal 
cancer”); JA3455 (“thyroid cancer”); JA3457 (“kidney 
cancer”); JA3458 (“endometrial cancer”); JA3459 
(“bladder cancer”); JA3465 (“melanoma”); JA3474 
(“prostate cancer”); JA3479 (“metastatic ovarian 
cancer”); JA3485 (“squamous cell tumor of her pelvis”). 
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B. The Facility 
The Apollo facility was a “warehouse style 
building that was not specifically constructed to house 
the complex manufacturing operation involving 
radioactive materials.”  JA1427.  As Plaintiffs 
emphasize, the Apollo facility was adjacent to a steel mill 
and “in the immediate neighborhood of residential 
areas.”  JA1576.   
The Apollo facility operated from approximately 
1953 to 1983 with uranium fuel manufacture beginning 
in 1958 and decommissioning beginning in 1978.  See 
JA1467; McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power 
Generation Grp., 131 F. Supp. 3d 352, 356 (W.D. Pa. 
2015).   
The Atomic Energy Commission (“AEC”) was the 
federal regulatory body in charge of overseeing the 
Apollo facility.  During the time that the Apollo facility 
operated, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) 
became “the statutory successor to the Atomic Energy 
Commission.”  In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1103, 1112 (3d Cir. 
1995).   
The Apollo facility emitted radiation as a 
necessary byproduct of manufacturing uranium fuel.  
Plaintiffs argue that that radiation was in excess of 
regulatory limits.  The focus in this dispute is on 
radiation emitted from the stacks, vents, and fans on the 
Apollo facility’s roof. 
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C. Evidence of Excessive Emissions 
Much of Plaintiffs’ evidence of excessive 
emissions indicates that emissions from the stacks or 
vents on the roof exceeded the maximum permissible 
concentration (“MPC”) for the facility.  Plaintiffs do not 
contest that the relevant maximum permissible 
concentration is 8.8 disintegrations per minute per cubic 
meter (dpm/m3).  See McMunn, 131 F. Supp. 3d at 373 
n.24; Pls.’ Br. 10; cf. JA3642. 
As discussed below, under the applicable 
regulations, the maximum permissible concentration is 
determined at the boundary of the “unrestricted area.”  
Defendants argue that the boundary of the unrestricted 
area is the boundary of the roof, while Plaintiffs argue 
that any emissions from any part of the roof—including 
emission from any stack, vent, or fan—should be less 
than the maximum permissible concentration. 
Plaintiffs point to evidence that they believe 
supports their position.  In a June 5, 1964 letter, the 
Director of the Division of State and Licensee Relations 
of the AEC implied that the NUMEC had not shown that 
the roof was a restricted area:  “[T]he roof area of the 
NUMEC facility is an unrestricted area unless access to 
this area is controlled from the radiation safety 
standpoint.”  JA5314.  Consistent with the 1964 letter 
implying that the entire roof may be unrestricted, 
Plaintiffs argue that NUMEC and AEC’s course of 
conduct shows that they both thought that stack 
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emissions were a regulatory concern because NUMEC 
and AEC compared stack emissions to the maximum 
permissible concentration.  For instance, in a 1967 report, 
a NUMEC employee wrote, “[T]he measured stack 
concentration frequently exceeds permissible levels.”  
JA5201.  The AEC similarly expressed concern about 
releases from stacks, as though the regulations created 
limitations on the stacks.  In a February 5, 1969 letter, the 
Director of the Division of Compliance of the AEC 
warned, “Based on your recorded data, the concentrations 
of radioactive material released from the facility through 
exhaust stacks to unrestricted areas exceed the limits 
specified in Appendix B, Table II of 10 CFR 20, contrary 
to 10 CFR 20.105(a), ‘Concentrations in effluents to 
unrestricted areas.’”  JA4700.   
In addition to the evidence about emissions from 
the stacks or vents, Plaintiffs’ evidence of excessive 
emissions fits into one or more of the following three 
categories: (1) evidence that the monitoring of emissions 
was not completely comprehensive; (2) data that there 
was excessive radiation in the area surrounding the 
facility; and (3) data showing excessive radiation being 
released but seemingly only for specific, and short, 
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periods of time (such as when the facility’s incinerator 
was being used).6   
Plaintiffs marshaled a large number of documents 
that they alleged created a genuine issue of material fact.  
The highlights of Plaintiffs’ documents are below: 
 In an April 20, 1964 letter, NUMEC 
Manager E.V. Barry wrote to Eber R. Price 
at the AEC that “average yearly 
concentrations at our property line” were 
being exceeded “when the winds are from 
the south quadrant” or in sections “when the 
winds are from the east quadrant.”  JA5163.   
                                           
 
6 Our summary of Plaintiffs’ evidence mirrors Plaintiffs’ 
own summary presented at the conclusion of oral 
argument.  When asked about “discharges measured at 
the roof edge,” Plaintiffs’ counsel (1) asserted that 
Defendants’ “roof edge monitoring . . . is remarkably 
incomplete”; (2) pointed to an April 20, 1964 letter 
(discussed below) in which NUMEC admitted that it 
sometimes exceeded permissible concentrations at the 
boundary of the roof; (3) highlighted the airborne 
concentrations of effluent when the plant’s incinerator 
was operating; and (4) noted “environmental monitors in 
the community.”  Oral Arg. Tr. at 39:10–40:20. 
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 Data for part of the year 1966 shows a high 
of 41.5 dpm/m3 and an average of 13.0 
dpm/m3.  See JA5188.  But, as Plaintiffs 
admit, the “high” refers to only one day.  
See Pls.’ Br. 47–48 (referring to “the same 
day” that the sampler gave its “highest 
reading”).  Additionally, this data comes 
from a nearby building and not the roof of 
the Apollo facility.  Compare JA5188, with 
JA5189.   
 An August 18, 1967 internal memorandum 
about the Apollo facility’s incinerator states, 
“Ever since the incinerator has been in 
operation it has been a consistent source of 
airborne contamination causing an over 
exposure [sic] to the operators and air levels 
above the M.P.C. in and out of the plant.”  
JA4428. 
 In a February 5, 1969 letter, the Director of 
the Division of Compliance of the AEC 
wrote, among other things, “Based on your 
recorded data, the concentrations of 
radioactive material released from the 
facility through exhaust stacks to 
unrestricted areas exceed the limits specified 
in Appendix B, Table II of 10 CFR 20, 
contrary to 10 CFR 20.105(a), 
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‘Concentrations in effluents to unrestricted 
areas.’”  JA4700.   
 A November 30, 1972 internal 
memorandum memorializing a phone call 
from the AEC states that the AEC 
commented that “NUMEC has been the 
worst offender of AEC regulations over the 
years,” that “[t]he AEC is strongly 
considering imposing civil penalties,” and 
mentions NUMEC was implementing 
corrective actions in, among other things, its 
“Liquid Waste Management Program,” and 
“Building Ventilation and Surveillance 
Program.”  See JA4439–40.   
 In a February 12, 1974 letter, a NUMEC 
employee criticized the Apollo facility for 
releasing too much radiation.  See JA4422 
(“It is . . . apparent from review of the data 
that said operations at the Apollo Site are 
not conducted so as to provide a minimal 
radiological impact on the 
environment . . . .”).  The same letter further 
states that there was heightened radioactivity 
in the area near the Apollo facility, many 
times in multiple of the background 
radiation because of “radiologically 
contaminated gaseous effluents.”  Id. 
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 A July 9, 1974 internal memorandum 
complains about “stack and liquid discards 
of SNM [special nuclear material] from the 
Apollo Plant” and tremendous losses of 
uranium through “gross irresponsibility.”  
See JA4427.   
However, AEC/NRC approved NUMEC’s 
operations at least three times.  First, in a report 
timestamped July 29, 1966, the AEC wrote, “No item of 
noncompliance with respect to [NUMEC’s] 
concentrations of radioactive effluents released to 
unrestricted areas was noted as a result of this 
investigation.”  JA5051.  Second, in 1968, the AEC 
concluded that NUMEC’s roof edge samples were below 
the maximum permissible concentrations.  JA5057 (“As 
can be seen, these average sample results are below 8.8 
[dpm/m3].”).  On May 26, 1969, the AEC granted an 
amendment to NUMEC’s license, “authoriz[ing] the 
discharge of radioactive material from any stack 
effluent . . . in concentrations up to one-hundred . . . 
times the applicable limits . . . in accordance with the 
statements, representations and conditions specified in 
your application dated March 5, 1969.”  JA5112.   
Finally, in 1995, the NRC issued a report 
investigating another NUMEC facility in Parks, 
Pennsylvania.  See 60 Fed. Reg. 35,571, 35,573 (1995).  
In that report, the NRC stated that, despite the 1969 
license amendment setting limits for stack emissions, the 
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regulatory limits were set at the boundary of the roof:  
“Accordingly, even though NUMEC was authorized to 
discharge at the stack up to 100 times the value specified 
in Appendix B, Table II, [under the 1969 license 
amendment,] NUMEC was still required to meet the 
limits at the site boundary (see footnote 8).”  60 Fed. 
Reg. 35,571, 35,573 (1995).  Footnote 8, in turn, states, 
“The values set forth in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, 
Table II, are the regulatory limits applicable at the site 
boundary, not at the stack.”  60 Fed. Reg. 35,571, 35,573 
n.8 (1995). 
II. THE SCIENCE OF CANCER 
This Court’s previous opinion, In re TMI 
Litigation, 193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999), set forth the 
basic scientific principles regarding the relationship 
between radiation and cancer.  See 193 F.3d at 629–55.  
No party disputes those background principles.  Because 
we rely on these principles here, we consider it helpful to 
summarize them.  Ionizing radiation can damage human 
cells.  Id. at 639–40.  “If cellular damage is not repaired, 
[the damage] may prevent the cell from surviving or 
reproducing, or it may result in a viable but modified 
cell.”  Id. at 640.  When an irradiated cell is only 
“modified rather than killed,” stochastic (or probabilistic) 
effects result.  Id. at 642.   
As the word “probabilistic” indicates, what 
happens next to the modified cell is uncertain.  In some 
cases, “cancer induction” occurs.  Id.  As we explained in 
  
17 
In re TMI Litigation, any increase in radiation exposure 
above zero is believed to increase the probability of 
carcinogenesis7:   
The probability that cancer will result from 
radiation increases proportionally with dose.  
However, it is currently believed that there 
is no threshold dose below which the 
probability of cancer induction is zero. . . .  
The linear risk model posits that each time 
energy is deposited in a cell or tissue, there 
is a probability of the induction of cancer. 
Id. at 642–43 (citations omitted).   
Even with state-of-the-art data, it is impossible to 
determine with certainty that radiation is the cause of a 
given incidence of cancer for three reasons.  First, 
numerous factors other than radiation may cause cancer.  
That is, “a given percentage of a defined population will 
contract cancer even absent any exposure to ionizing 
radiation.”  Id. a 643–44.8  Second, there is no clear 
                                           
 
7 “Carcinogenesis is currently believed to be a multistep 
process requiring two or more intracellular events to 
transform a normal cell into a cancer cell.”  In re TMI 
Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 643 (3d Cir. 1999).  
8 “[T]he task of establishing causation is greatly 
complicated by the reality that a given percentage of a 
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difference between cancers caused by radiation or by 
other factors.  No characteristic of a given cancer (such 
as its type or severity) are known to suggest that 
“manmade” radiation or even any radiation was the 
cancer’s cause.  See id. at 643 (“[M]edical evaluation, by 
itself, can neither prove nor disprove that a specific 
malignancy was caused by a specific radiation 
exposure.”).  Third, because the relevant changes occur 
on the cellular level, they are not detected or detectable at 
the time they occur.  It can take many years—seemingly 
a variable number of years—between an exposure to 
radiation and the “possible detection of a resulting 
cancer.”  Id. (defining the “latency period” as “[t]he 
period between exposure to radiation and possible 
detection”).  Thus, in a case like this one, the factfinder 
will always have to use ex-post data to ascertain whether 
any radiation—let alone any particular radioactive 
exposure—disrupted the cell in the past.   
                                                                                              
 
defined population will contract cancer even absent any 
exposure to ionizing radiation.  In industrialized 
countries where the life expectancy averages about 70 
years, about 30% of the population will develop cancer 
and about 20% of the population will die of cancer.”  In 
re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d at 643–44.   
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT’S RELEVANT 
RULINGS 
We are reviewing the orders granting Defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment.  In its summary judgment 
orders, the District Court adopted the reasoning of the 
Magistrate Judge to whom all pretrial motions had been 
referred.  See Order, McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox 
Power Generation Grp., No. 2:10-cv-00143-DSC-RCM 
(W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2011), ECF No. 79.   
Two earlier rulings set the stage for the summary 
judgment motion.  Those two rulings are (1) a September 
12, 2012 order following a “Lone Pine” case 
management order,9 and (2) a February 27, 2014 order 
adopting in part and rejecting in part the Magistrate 
Judge’s recommendations with regard to excluding the 
parties’ experts under Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
                                           
 
9 A Lone Pine order is a pretrial order, based on Lore v. 
Lone Pine Corp., No. L-33606-85, 1986 WL 637507 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 18, 1986), that “require[s] 
plaintiffs to provide facts in support of their claims” 
including by expert evidence “or risk having their cases 
dismissed.”  In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 
718 F.3d 236, 240 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2013). 
  
20 
A. Lone Pine 
On January 25, 2012, the Magistrate Judge issued 
the Lone Pine order, requiring Plaintiffs to provide prima 
facie evidence of, among other things, the “name of the 
specific radionuclide(s) released from Defendants’ 
facilities in excess of the applicable federal permissible 
limits” and “an identification of each exposure 
pathway(s) through which each Plaintiff was exposed to 
each specific radionuclide.”  Order at 1, McMunn v. 
Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Grp., No. 2:10-cv-
0143-DSC-RCM (W.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2012), ECF No. 109. 
On September 12, 2012, following the parties’ 
responses to the Lone Pine order, the Magistrate Judge 
issued an order limiting Plaintiffs’ theories of recovery.  
See McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation 
Grp., 896 F. Supp. 2d 347 (W.D. Pa. 2012).  In that 
order, the Magistrate Judge held that the Plaintiffs would 
be allowed only “to pursue, offer or rely upon evidence 
referring or relating to any claim based upon exposure 
through . . . airborne exposure to uranium . . . from . . . 
the Apollo facility during its years of operation.”  Id. at 
358–61; see also id. at 364.  Plaintiffs do not challenge 
this Lone Pine order on appeal.   
B. Daubert 
On July 12, 2013, the Magistrate Judge 
recommended that the District Court (1) grant some of 
Defendants’ Daubert motions; (2) deny the remainder of 
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Defendants’ Daubert motions; and (3) deny all of 
Plaintiffs’ Daubert motions.  See McMunn v. Babcock & 
Wilcox Power Generation Grp., Nos. 10-143 et al., 2013 
WL 3487560 (W.D. Pa. July 12, 2013).  Specifically, the 
Magistrate Judge recommended excluding the testimony 
of Plaintiffs’ three general causation experts—Dr. 
Howard Hu, Dr. Joseph Ring, and Mr. Bernd Franke—
and Plaintiffs’ specific causation expert, Dr. James 
Melius.  Only the rulings with regard to Melius’s 
testimony bear directly on this appeal. 
Melius’s expert report used the methodology of 
differential diagnosis.  Melius provided a roughly one-
page summary of each Plaintiff’s background and alleged 
exposure and then concluded for each Plaintiff:  “[I]t is 
my professional medical opinion that [Plaintiff’s] 
exposures to uranium and other radioactive materials 
released from the Apollo nuclear facility made a 
significant contribution to the development of” his or her 
cancer.  E.g., JA3448, 3465, 3490.  For most of the 
Plaintiffs, Melius added language substantially like the 
following:  “This is reinforced by the lack of other risk 
factors in [her or his] history that would account for the 
development of this illness.”  E.g., JA3448.10   
                                           
 
10 For a handful of Plaintiffs—but only some of the 
Plaintiffs with a history of smoking—Melius identified 
smoking as the only confounding factor.  E.g., JA3451 
  
22 
The Magistrate Judge recommended excluding 
Melius’s testimony because Melius failed to rule out 
other confounding factors and did not have information 
about doses of radiation to which each Plaintiff was 
exposed.  With regard to confounding factors, the 
Magistrate Judge criticized Melius’s “differential 
diagnosis” because Melius “fail[ed] to explain why he 
did not rule out smoking, obesity, genetic factors, 
benzene exposure, radon and many other possible and 
obvious alternative causes in order to conclude in each 
instance that uranium is the cause of the individual’s 
cancer.”  McMunn, 2013 WL 3487560, at *28.  With 
regard to dose, the Magistrate Judge criticized Melius for 
failing to make or use any estimate of any Plaintiff’s dose 
“or the maximum or minimum amount to which the 
person was exposed.”  Id. at *29.  Instead, to determine 
that Plaintiffs’ exposures were sufficient to serve as a 
“significant contribution” to their cancers, Melius relied 
on general testimony about radiation—Dr. Hu’s 
testimony that radiation from uranium could cause 
cancer—and the assumption that Plaintiffs were exposed 
to dangerous levels of radiation because “the Plaintiffs 
lived or worked within 1.5 miles of the Apollo facility.”  
                                                                                              
 
(“This is reinforced by the lack of other risk factors in his 
history that would account for the development of this 
illness other than smoking which also would have made a 
contribution.”). 
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Id. at *28.  The Magistrate Judge’s two criticisms 
dovetailed with a particular flaw in Melius’s testimony:  
Melius “rule[d] out oral contraceptive use if the dose was 
small and smoking if the person quit 10–15 years ago, 
thereby taking dose into account.”  Id. at *29.  The 
Magistrate Judge concluded that Melius’s methodology 
“has not been generally accepted in the medical and 
scientific communities” and was “untestable.”  Id. at *29. 
On February 27, 2014, the District Court rejected 
the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation to the 
extent that the Magistrate Judge recommended granting 
Defendants’ Daubert motions with regard to Melius and 
Plaintiffs’ general causation experts.11  With regard to 
Melius specifically, the District Court placed great 
weight on (1) this Court’s past discussion of differential 
diagnosis methodology and (2) the fact that Melius did 
not have access to perfect information.  First, the District 
Court held that Melius “adequately addressed other 
possible causes of Plaintiffs’ cancers, both known and 
                                           
 
11 The District Court adopted the portion of the report and 
recommendation in which the Magistrate Judge 
recommended denying the exclusion of Defendants’ 
experts and denying the exclusion of most of Plaintiffs’ 
experts.  See McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power 
Generation Grp., Nos. 2:10cv143 et al., 2014 WL 
814878, at *20 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2014).   
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unknown” because Melius reviewed information about 
the Plaintiffs.  McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power 
Generation Grp., Nos. 2:10cv143 et al., 2014 WL 
814878, at *14 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2014).  The District 
Court also cited and quoted In re Paoli Railroad Yard 
PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994), and Heller v. 
Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999), for 
the propositions that a medical expert performing a 
differential diagnosis does not need to rule out every 
alternative factor and that medical experts are permitted 
to exercise their judgments when conducting a 
differential diagnosis.  See McMunn, 2014 WL 814878, 
at *15. 
Second, with regard to dose, the District Court 
held that there was “enough support in the record for the 
contention that the Plaintiffs’ exposure levels exceeded 
the normal background level” for Melius to use a 
“qualitative analysis” rather than a “quantitative dose 
analysis.”  Id. at *14.  In particular, Melius could rely on 
“NUMEC’s failure to monitor emissions.”  Id.  Because 
Melius’s analysis relied on the absence of data, the 
District Court agreed with Melius that a “quantitative 
dose calculation . . . may in fact be far more speculative 
than a qualitative analysis.”  Id.   
The District Court further held that a dose analysis 
was not necessary for Plaintiffs’ claims to succeed.  The 
District Court stated that In re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 
613 (3d Cir. 1999), “did not require a plaintiff prove a 
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quantified dose in order to prove personal injuries caused 
by the release of radiation.”  McMunn, 2014 WL 814878, 
at *13.  Then, the District Court cited to other cases that 
did not require a dose.  Id. at *13–14 (quoting and citing 
Kannankeril v. Terminix Int’l, 128 F.3d 802, 808–09 (3d 
Cir. 1997), Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 924 (8th 
Cir. 2001), and Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 
F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999)).  
At Defendants’ request, the District Court certified 
the Daubert order for interlocutory appeal.  See McMunn 
v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Grp., Nos. 
2:10cv143 et al., 2014 WL 12530940 (W.D. Pa. May 7, 
2014).  We denied Defendants’ petition for interlocutory 
appeal.  See McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power 
Generation Grp., No. 14-8074 (3d Cir. June 16, 2014). 
C. Summary Judgment 
On May 7, 2015, the Magistrate Judge filed a very 
thorough report recommending that the District Court 
grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 
Plaintiffs’ Price-Anderson public liability claims and 
Defendants’ motion for a judgment on the pleadings on 
all of Plaintiffs’ common-law claims.  See McMunn v. 
Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Grp., 131 F. Supp. 
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3d 352, 359–404 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2015) (republishing 
the report and recommendation).12 
The Magistrate Judge recommended that the 
District Court grant summary judgment because 
Plaintiffs (1) failed “to raise a genuine issue for trial on 
breach of duty” and (2) failed “to proffer evidence of 
exposure and dose.”  Id. at 389, 404.13  First, with regard 
to the breach of duty, the Magistrate Judge held that 
“[t]he regulatory standard applicable to the emission of 
radionuclides in airborne effluent to off-site areas . . . 
when the Apollo facility operated . . . was 10 C.F.R. 
§ 20.106”—“not some other regulation, license 
requirement or other issue.”  Id. at 368–69, 388; see also 
In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1103, 1108 n.10 (3d Cir. 1995) 
                                           
 
12 Because Plaintiffs did not appeal the District Court’s 
adoption of the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to 
dismiss Plaintiffs’ common-law claims, we need not 
discuss the common-law claims.   
13 The Magistrate Judge did not reach any other issues 
regarding Plaintiffs’ Price-Anderson public liability 
claims.  As the Magistrate Judge noted, Defendants 
raised other issues in separate summary judgment 
motions that the District Court denied as moot or denied 
without prejudice to refile.  See McMunn, 131 F. Supp. 
3d at 361 & n.3, 404. 
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(applying “the relevant federal regulations . . . in place at 
the time” of the radioactive release caused by Three Mile 
Island accident at issue).   
Section 20.106 prohibited a licensee from 
“releas[ing] to an unrestricted area radioactive material in 
concentrations which exceed the limits specified in 
Appendix ‘B’, Table II of this part.”  10 C.F.R. 
§ 20.106(a) (1980).  The regulation further states that 
“the concentration limits in Appendix ‘B’, Table II of 
this part shall apply at the boundary of the restricted 
area.”  10 C.F.R. § 20.106(d). 
The Magistrate Judge rejected Plaintiffs’ argument 
that the Table II maximum permissible concentration 
applied directly to the uranium effluent released from the 
stacks on the roof.  First, the Magistrate Judge 
determined that the roof of the Apollo facility was a 
restricted area.  McMunn, 131 F. Supp. 3d at 386–87.  
Second, the Magistrate Judge held that the measurements 
of uranium effluent to be compared to the maximum 
permissible concentration should be those taken “at the 
roof boundary.”  Id. at 387–88.  Because Plaintiffs’ only 
expert testimony about breach applied the concentration 
limits at the stacks and not at the roof boundaries, the 
Magistrate Judge held that Plaintiffs failed to proffer 
expert evidence of a breach that raised a genuine issue of 
material fact.  See id. at 389. 
With regard to exposure and dose, the Magistrate 
Judge held that Plaintiffs’ causation case failed because 
  
28 
Plaintiffs failed to show that each Plaintiff was exposed 
to enough radiation to cause his or her cancer.  First, the 
Magistrate Judge granted Defendants’ motion to deem 
certain facts admitted. See id. at 394; Plaintiffs’ Local 
Rule 56.C.1 Response, No. 2:10-cv-001343-DSC-RCM 
(W.D. Pa. filed Dec. 5, 2014), ECF No. 342.  Then, the 
Magistrate Judge explained that, under In re TMI 
Litigation, 193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999), each Plaintiff 
had to show that he or she was exposed to “inhaled 
uranium from the Apollo plant in excess of normal 
background radiation amounts.”  McMunn, 131 F. Supp. 
3d at 396–97, 399.  Thus, the Magistrate Judge held that 
“Plaintiffs must provide . . . an estimate of the dose they 
received which caused their cancers.”  Id. at 399.  As 
discussed above, Melius relied on Plaintiffs’ other 
experts for exposure, but none of Plaintiffs’ other experts 
calculated exposure or dose for any of the Plaintiffs.  See 
id.  
Further, the Magistrate Judge rejected Plaintiffs’ 
argument that Defendants were “estopped from 
contesting [Plaintiffs’] lack of evidence of exposure and 
dose” because Defendants failed to keep accurate 
records.  Id. at 402–04. The Magistrate Judge also 
rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that law of the case required 
the Magistrate Judge to deny summary judgment on 
causation because the District Court had ruled that 
Melius’s testimony was admissible in its Daubert ruling.  
See id. at 399–402.   
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On September 15, 2015, the District Court adopted 
the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation over 
Plaintiffs’ objections.  See id. at 357.  The District Court 
stated that it “review[ed] . . . the record of these 
cases, . . . the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation, and the Objections thereto,” but 
offered no further explanation for its decision.  Id. 
Certain related cases were not consolidated with 
the main case when the District Court issued its 
September 15, 2015 Memorandum Order.  The District 
Court ultimately entered orders adopting the reasoning of 
the September 15, 2015 Memorandum Order in those 
cases.  See JA281–92; SJa3–SJa8. 
Timely notices of appeal followed in each case 
before us.14  Additionally, Defendants cross-appealed 
many—but not all—of the cases before us, requesting 
that we reverse the District Court’s Daubert order. 
                                           
 
14 Plaintiffs’ Notices of Appeal also objected to orders 
excluding the expert report of Dr. Steve Wing.  See, e.g., 
Ja1.  Because Plaintiffs presented no argument regarding 
Dr. Wing’s report, any issues or objections concerning it 
have been waived.   
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JURISDICTION 
The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction 
over these actions under 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) because 
this is a public liability action arising out of a nuclear 
incident in the Western District of Pennsylvania.  This 
Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ appeals under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
Plaintiffs argue that we did not have jurisdiction 
over Defendants’ cross-appeal relating to the District 
Court’s denial of their Daubert motion regarding Melius 
because Defendants are not aggrieved by that denial.  As 
the Supreme Court observed in Deposit Guaranty 
National Bank v. Roper, “Ordinarily, only a party 
aggrieved by a judgment or order of a district court may 
exercise the statutory right to appeal therefrom.  A party 
who receives all that he has sought generally is not 
aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and cannot 
appeal from it.”  445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980); see also 
Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp., 857 F.2d 96, 
102 (3d Cir. 1988) (“Because they are completely 
satisfied with the final judgment and object only to 
interlocutory rulings of the district court, we lack 
jurisdiction over their appeal.”). 
We need not determine whether we have 
jurisdiction.  We simply follow Third Circuit practice and 
dismiss Defendants’ cross-appeals as “superfluous.”  
Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 283 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (“Yet a party, without taking a cross-appeal, 
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may urge in support of an order from which an appeal 
has been taken any matter appearing in the record, at 
least if the party relied on it in the district court.”).  As 
such, we consider the parties’ Daubert arguments to 
concern causation only as an “alternate ground for 
affirmance.”  Nanavati, 857 F.2d at 102.  Accordingly, 
we have disregarded Defendants’ reply brief in support 
of their cross-appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review on summary judgment is 
well known:  “Because we are reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, our standard of review is plenary.  
Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.’”  Constitution Party of Pa. v. Cortes, 824 F.3d 386, 
393 (3d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted) (quoting Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a)).   
DISCUSSION 
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court 
because Plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of fact that 
would allow a reasonable jury to find that Defendants 
breached their duty and because Melius’s conclusory 
expert report would not allow a reasonable jury to find 
that Defendants’ radiation was a substantial factor in 
causing Plaintiffs’ cancers.   
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I. DUTY 
The District Court15 held that Plaintiff failed to 
establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Defendants breached their duty to Plaintiffs.  We agree 
with the District Court that Defendants’ duty was defined 
by § 20.106. 
In three different ways, Plaintiffs try to show that 
Defendants owed a duty other than to prevent the release 
of uranium effluent that exceeds the maximum 
permissible concentrations at the boundary of the roof, 
when the effluent is averaged over a full year.  First, 
Plaintiffs argue that any emission from the roof counts 
under § 20.106.  Second, Plaintiffs argue that more 
onerous maximum permissible concentrations for roof 
emissions were created by the 1969 amendment to 
NUMEC’s license.  And, third, Plaintiffs argue that they 
had the option to decline annual averaging, allowing 
them to find breaches of duty where emissions exceeded 
                                           
 
15 Because the District Court “adopt[ed] the Report and 
Recommendation as the Opinion of [the District] Court,” 
McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Grp., 
131 F. Supp. 3d 352, 357 (W.D. Pa. 2015), “we will refer 
to the adopted opinion as that of the district court,” USX 
Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 444 F.3d 192, 197 n.8 (3d 
Cir. 2006). 
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the maximum permissible concentration over short 
periods of time.  As discussed below, these attempts to 
redefine the duty fail because they all conflict with 
§ 20.106 and because we owe Auer deference to the 
NRC’s interpretation of § 20.106.   
A. The Roof Was a Restricted Area 
Under § 20.106(d), the maximum permissible 
concentrations are assessed “at the boundary of the 
restricted area.”  10 C.F.R. § 20.106(d).  A “restricted 
area” is any area where “access . . . is controlled by the 
licensee for purposes of protection of individuals from 
exposure to radiation and radioactive materials.”  10 
C.F.R. § 20.3(a)(14).  Plaintiffs argue that the entire roof 
was unrestricted16 such that emissions from anywhere on 
the roof—including the stacks and fans—should count 
directly against the limits.  Plaintiffs’ argument is 
undermined by a 1995 NRC report that states that the 
“regulatory limits [are] applicable at the site boundary, 
                                           
 
16 The definition of “unrestricted area” is merely a mirror 
of the definition of “restricted area”:  “‘Unrestricted area’ 
means any area access to which is not controlled by the 
licensee for purposes of protection of individuals from 
exposure to radiation and radioactive materials, and any 
area used for residential quarters.”  10 C.F.R. 
§ 20.3(a)(17). 
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not at the stack.”  60 Fed. Reg. 35,571, 35,573 n.8 
(1995).  
Plaintiffs present two arguments as to why the roof 
is unrestricted: (1) an historical argument based on a 
series of letters between the AEC and NUMEC and (2) a 
functional argument that questions whether access to the 
roof was “controlled by the licensee for purposes of 
protection of individuals from exposure to radiation and 
radioactive materials.” 
With regard to the historical argument, Plaintiffs’ 
strongest support is a June 5, 1964 letter, in which the 
Director of the Division of State and Licensee Relations 
of the AEC stated that the roof would be “unrestricted” if 
access were not controlled:  “[T]he roof area of the 
NUMEC facility is an unrestricted area unless access to 
this area is controlled from the radiation safety 
standpoint.”  JA5314.   
Plaintiffs also rely on other correspondence in 
which NUMEC and AEC compared stack emissions to 
the applicable maximum permissible concentration.  For 
instance, in a 1967 report, a NUMEC employee wrote, 
“[T]he measured stack concentration frequently exceeds 
permissible levels.”  JA5201.  The AEC similarly 
expressed concern about releases from stacks, as though 
the regulations created limitations on the stacks.  In a 
February 5, 1969 letter, the Director of the Division of 
Compliance of the AEC warned, “Based on your 
recorded data, the concentrations of radioactive material 
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released from the facility through exhaust stacks to 
unrestricted areas exceed the limits specified in Appendix 
B, Table II of 10 CFR 20, contrary to 10 CFR 20.105(a), 
‘Concentrations in effluents to unrestricted areas.’”  
JA4700.  Additionally, the fact that NUMEC sought—
and the AEC granted in 1969—approval to exceed the 
maximum permissible concentration by one-hundred 
times at the stack, see JA5112, suggests that there was a 
pre-existing regulatory limit at the stack.   
Plaintiffs’ functional argument focuses on the 
definition of a restricted area in the regulation.  The 
regulation states that a “restricted area” is any area where 
“access . . . is controlled by the licensee for purposes of 
protection of individuals from exposure to radiation and 
radioactive materials.”  10 C.F.R. § 20.3(a)(14).  It is 
uncontested that the roof could only be accessed by 
locked hatches from ladders located inside the building.  
See JA5035–36 (“There are no outside ladders on 
NUMEC’s property.  We have two inside ladders with 
normally closed and locked hatches at the top.”); JA5317 
(“The roof hatch is kept locked with keys in the 
possession of the health and safety technician.”).17   
                                           
 
17 Plaintiffs argue that NUMEC conceded that the roof is 
unrestricted based on the 1966 letter from NUMEC to the 
AEC that states, “We regard the roof area as an 
unrestricted area.”  JA4649.  The District Court 
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Plaintiffs argue that these hatches do not show that 
the roof was “controlled . . . for purposes of 
protection . . . from exposure to radiation.”  Relying on a 
1965 NUMEC letter, they argue that certain safety 
measures—e.g., alpha survey instruments—are required 
to show why the access is controlled.  See Pls.’ Br. 40–
41.   
                                                                                              
 
concluded that “unrestricted” was “a typographical 
error.”  McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Generation Grp., 
131 F. Supp. 3d 352, 378 (W.D. Pa. 2015).  At summary 
judgment, district courts should not determine whether a 
particular phrasing is a scrivener’s error when other 
possibilities are reasonable.  See, e.g., Coffill v. Coffill, 
656 F.3d 93, 95–96 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that it was 
error to rule that a purported scrivener’s error existed 
“without evidentiary hearing and evidentiary basis”).  We 
agree with the District Court that, in the context of the 
correspondence in the record and the surrounding 
sentences, it would be unreasonable or absurd to read that 
sentence in the 1966 letter as a concession that NUMEC 
considered the roof “unrestricted.”  The same paragraph 
explains the unrestricted areas were at the “roof edge”:  
“[T]he roof edge air samplers are measuring directly the 
concentration being discharged to unrestricted areas.”  
JA5317.   
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Ultimately, we defer to the expertise of the NRC as 
to where the restricted area of the Apollo facility ended.  
In 1995, the NRC issued a report investigating another 
NUMEC facility in Parks, Pennsylvania.  60 Fed. Reg. 
35,571, 35,573 (1995).  Even though the report was about 
the Parks facility, the NRC referred to the 1969 letter that 
allowed NUMEC to exceed regulatory limits at the 
Apollo facility’s stacks.  The NRC stated that, despite a 
1969 license amendment setting limits for stack 
emissions, the regulatory limits were set at the boundary 
of the roof.  “Accordingly, even though NUMEC was 
authorized to discharge at the stack up to 100 times the 
value specified in Appendix B, Table II, [under a 1969 
license amendment,] NUMEC was still required to meet 
the limits at the site boundary (see footnote 8).”  Id.  
Footnote 8, in turn, stated, “The values set forth in 10 
CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II, are the regulatory 
limits applicable at the site boundary, not at the stack.”  
Id. at 35,573 n.8. 
Under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–62 
(1997), we defer to the NRC’s “fair and considered 
judgment” of its interpretation of its regulation.  One 
could argue that the NRC should receive less deference 
to the extent that the NRC’s 1995 position conflicts with 
Plaintiffs’ historical evidence.  In this case, we believe 
we still owe full deference.  The Supreme Court’s main 
concern with an agency switching positions has been 
with circumstances in which the new position could 
cause “unfair surprise.”  Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. 
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v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170–71 (2007) (“[A]s long as 
interpretive changes create no unfair surprise[,] . . . the 
change in interpretation alone presents no separate 
ground for disregarding the Department’s present 
interpretation.”).  Here, our Auer deference would not 
harm any reliance interests. 
Even if we did not defer to the NRC, Defendants’ 
interpretation of a “restricted area” is more consistent 
with our precedent than is Plaintiffs’ functional 
argument.  In 1995, we held that “[t]he definitions of 
‘restricted’ and ‘unrestricted areas’ demonstrate that the 
C.F.R. sections governing persons in ‘unrestricted areas’ 
were intended to cover persons outside a nuclear plant’s 
boundaries, i.e., the general public.”  In re TMI, 67 F.3d 
at 1114 (footnote omitted).  Although denial of access to 
the “general public” alone does not turn a space into a 
restricted area, our understanding has been focused more 
on whether a licensee exercises control rather than on the 
precise safety measures chosen by the licensee.  Other 
than the isolated statements by NUMEC, Plaintiffs give 
us no reason to believe that more than locked hatches 
were needed to control access to the roof for purposes of 
protecting individuals from radiation.   
B. The License Did Not Create a Duty 
As noted above, in 1969, the AEC approved 
NUMEC’s request to amend its license to allow “the 
discharge of radioactive material from any stack . . . in 
concentrations up to one-hundred (100) times the 
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applicable limits specified in Appendix B, Table II,” 
contingent on satisfactory sampling “at the plant roof 
perimeter” and “in the neighboring unrestricted areas of 
[the] plant.”  JA5112.  Plaintiffs argue that this 1969 
license amendment now creates a tort duty that 
Defendants violated by discharging more than 100 times 
the maximum permissible concentration at the stacks.   
In a Price-Anderson public liability claim, “federal 
law preempts state tort law on the standard of care.”  In 
re TMI, 67 F.3d at 1107.  Our 1995 opinion in In re TMI 
instructs that the duty that survives preemption must be a 
regulatory requirement meant to protect people like 
Plaintiffs.  Following In re TMI, we look to the principles 
of negligence per se (by analogy) and to other courts’ 
interpretation of duty under the Price-Anderson Act.  
Because this license requirement was only meant to make 
it easier to assess whether NUMEC violated 10 C.F.R. 
§ 20.106 at the boundary of the restricted area—not to 
create an independent obligation—we hold this license 
requirement does not supply a tort duty. 
In the 1995 TMI case, plaintiffs argued that the “as 
low as is reasonably achievable” principle (“ALARA”) 
established the tort duty.  This Court held instead that 10 
C.F.R. §§ 20.105, 106 established the relevant duty.  Two 
of our major considerations were that (1) §§ 20.105 and 
20.106 indicated they should apply to effluent emissions 
to the public, In re TMI, 67 F.3d at 1114, and (2) the 
ALARA regulation states that it was not “to be construed 
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as radiation protection standards” but was rather meant to 
be a discretionary tool for regulatory agencies, id. at 
1114–15 (internal quotation mark omitted).  Thus, we see 
that our concerns in 1995 reflected (1) whether the 
regulation was meant to cover the persons allegedly 
affected and (2) whether the regulation was meant to 
establish actual standards or operating principles for the 
agency.  These same considerations are not present here.  
The limitations on the stacks were meant to show levels 
below which there could not be a violation at the 
boundary.  Thus, they were not directly protective of 
persons in unrestricted areas and were a discretionary 
choice by the AEC to make policing NUMEC easier.   
The 1995 TMI case also instructs us to consider 
principles from negligence per se.  In that case, we 
explained that the duty analysis under the Price-Anderson 
Act “is analogous to the practice followed by many 
jurisdictions with negligence per se cases.  In such cases, 
where defendants violated the relevant statute or 
regulation, courts have held as a matter of law that 
plaintiffs have satisfied the first two elements of their 
cause of action: the duty and breach of duty.”  In re TMI, 
67 F.3d at 1118.   
Plaintiffs’ objection that we would nullify the 
license requirements if we refused to use them as the 
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standard of care18 assumes that every legal requirement 
must be enforceable by a civil plaintiff.  That assumption 
is contrary to fundamental principles of negligence per 
se, under which courts must ask “whether the policy 
behind the legislative enactment will be appropriately 
served by using it to impose and measure civil damage 
liability.”  Frederick L. v. Thomas, 578 F.2d 513, 517 n.8 
(3d Cir. 1978). 
Negligence per se only attaches to a statutory or 
administrative duty when its direct effect is to prevent the 
harm at issue to the type of person allegedly injured.  See 
Byrne v. Matczak, 254 F.2d 525, 528 (3d Cir. 1958) 
(“[T]he general principle is that the violation of a statute 
will not create a liability unless it is the efficient cause of 
the injury.”); Congini ex rel. Congini v. Portersville 
Valve Co., 470 A.2d 515, 518 (Pa. 1983); Restatement 
(Second) Torts § 286.19  We have held that “general 
                                           
 
18 “To hold that NUMEC had no duty to obey the AEC’s 
regulatory caps stated in its license would be tantamount 
to holding that the AEC had no authority to set those 
limits.”  Pls.’ Br. 35. 
19 When we adopted 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.105 and 20.106 as 
the standard of care, we cited Restatement (Second) of 
Torts for the proposition that a court can adopt 
regulations as the standard of care.  See In re TMI, 67 
F.3d at 1113 n.24. 
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licensing or permit schemes do not usually establish 
standards of competence; they do not usually represent 
judgments that a violation of the licensing scheme will 
generally constitute the breach of a duty to a particular 
person rather than to the state.”  Beaver Valley Power 
Co. v. Nat’l Eng’g & Contracting Co., 883 F.2d 1210, 
1221–22 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Talley v. Danek Med., 
Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 159 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Even if the 
regulatory scheme as a whole is designed to protect the 
public or to promote safety, the licensing duty itself is not 
a standard of care, but an administrative requirement.”); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288 (“The court will not 
adopt as the standard of conduct . . .  the requirements 
of . . . administrative regulation whose purpose is found 
to be exclusively . . . to protect the interests of the state or 
any subdivision of it as such.”).20   
                                           
 
20 Following oral argument, Plaintiffs filed a letter under 
Rule 28(j) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
with additional cases that showed regulations creating 
tort duties.  None of them is contrary to the reasoning 
above.  Rather, Plaintiffs’ 28(j) cases pertain to situations 
in which statutes explicitly create a duty for license 
violations, see 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (“[A]ny citizen may 
commence a civil action on his own behalf . . . against 
any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of . . . . 
an effluent standard.”); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f) (“[T]he term 
‘effluent standard or limitation under this chapter’ 
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Finally, as in 1995, we look to other circuits’ 
caselaw as “instructive.”  In re TMI, 67 F.3d at 1113.  
Here, we see that no other circuit has adopted Plaintiffs’ 
proposed standard.  See Adkins v. Chevron Corp., 960 F. 
Supp. 2d 761, 766, 772–73 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) (holding 
that license violations do not create duty in a Price-
Anderson public liability action). 
The history of the license amendment shows that 
its purpose was not to create an independent duty to 
minimize discharge from the stacks.  On November 13, 
1968, Roger D. Caldwell, NUMEC Manager, Health and 
Safety, sent a letter to Donald A. Nussbaumer at the 
AEC.  The letter requested a change to NUMEC’s license 
that would “permit[] concentrations up to 100 MPCa in 
any stack’s effluent, providing the concentration at the 
roof edge is permissible.”  JA5073.  Caldwell justified 
                                                                                              
 
means . . . a permit or condition thereof . . . .”); N.Y. 
Veh. & Traffic Law § 509(3) (“Whenever a permit or 
license is required to operate a motor vehicle, no person 
shall operate any motor vehicle in violation of any 
restriction contained on, or applicable to, the permit or 
license.”), or situations where preemption of alternative 
laws is not as complete as here, see Gomez v. St. Jude 
Medical Daig Div. Inc., 442 F.3d 919, 928–30 (5th Cir. 
2006) (discussing the scope of preemption relating to the 
Medical Device Amendments). 
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the request by pointing to empirical data relating to 
diffusion factors at the Apollo facility—that is, by 
showing that amounts released at the stacks would be 
much less at the roof edge.  See JA5074–76. 
On February 5, 1969, Lawrence D. Low, AEC, 
Director, Division of Compliance wrote to Zalman 
Shapiro, NUMEC President.  Low wrote that “the 
concentrations of radioactive material released from the 
facility through exhaust stacks to unrestricted areas 
exceed the limits . . . contrary to 10 CFR 20.106(a).”  
JA5079–80.  In the same section of the letter, Low 
acknowledged NUMEC’s request that its license “be 
amended to permit use of a dilution factor for stack 
effluents.”  JA6080.   
On February 25, 1969, Shapiro responded, 
explaining that a higher concentration limit could be 
applied at the stacks to determine whether NUMEC 
violated its maximum permissible concentration at the 
roof edge:   
We recognize the necessity for an 
amendment to our license which would 
reflect appropriately the means of varifying 
[sic] the effectiveness of atmospheric 
dilution in reducing concentration in 
unrestricted areas.  In this connection, we 
submitted on November 13, 1968 a request 
for an amendment to our license which 
would place primary reliance on roof 
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perimeter sampling in lieu of stack sampling 
as a means of measuring releases to 
unrestricted areas.  At a meeting on January 
17, 1969 with Licensing and Compliance 
personnel, it was concluded that the off-site 
environment sampling program should be 
included as a part of our license amendment 
application to provide additional assurance 
with respect to the effectiveness of 
atmospheric dilution.  Accordingly, we are 
preparing and will submit by March 7, 1969 
a revised application which, if approved, 
should provide an acceptable means of 
varifying [sic] compliance with Part 20. 
JA5083–84.   
On March 10, 1969, Caldwell submitted a “revised 
application to permit concentration to 100 MPCa in any 
stack’s effluent.”  JA5087.  Again, Caldwell “justified” 
the proposed limits by pointing to empirical data showing 
dilution factors at the roof perimeter.  Id. 
On May 26, 1969, Nussbaumer at the AEC wrote 
to Caldwell at NUMEC granting the amendment to 
NUMEC’s license “to authorize the discharge of 
radioactive material from any stack effluent . . . in 
concentrations up to one-hundred . . . times the 
applicable limits . . . in accordance with the statements, 
representations and conditions specified in your 
application dated March 5, 1969.”  JA5112 (emphasis 
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added).  Nussbaumer added, “We consider the 
environmental sampling program required by Condition 
2 above to be a means for providing backup data and 
evidence that your roof edge sampling results are 
adequately representative of the concentrations released 
to the unrestricted areas.”  JA5112–13 (emphasis added).  
Thus, even at the time, the AEC, via Nussbaumer, 
accepted NUMEC’s “representations” about the 
relationship between the stack discharges and the roof 
edge and that the roof edge monitors would be used to 
determine the concentrations “released to the unrestricted 
areas.” 
In 1995, the NRC agreed that NUMEC’s purpose 
in seeking the amendment assumed that all requirements 
would be met if the emission at the boundaries were 
below the maximum permissible concentration:  “By 
application dated November 13, 1968, and supplement 
dated March 5, 1969, and pursuant to 10 CFR 20.106(b), 
NUMEC requested that License SNM-145 be amended to 
permit concentrations up to 100 times the limits specified 
in Part 20, Appendix B, Table II, in any stack effluent, 
provided that concentrations at the roof edge and in the 
local environment complied with 10 CFR Part 20 limits.”  
In re Babcock & Wilcox Co., 41 N.R.C. 489, 492–93 
(June 26, 1995); see also 10 C.F.R. § 20.106(b).  Thus, it 
is clear that the stack-discharge license restriction was 
created as a threshold to test for emissions at the 
boundary of the restricted area.   
  
47 
Because the license requirement was only an 
administrative safe harbor for NUMEC’s compliance 
with the emissions maximum set at the boundary of the 
restricted area, it does not create a tort duty here.   
C. Plaintiffs Had to Show that Maximum Permissible 
Concentration was Exceeded on Average Over a Full 
Year 
Section 20.106 states, “For purposes of this 
section[,] concentrations may be averaged over a period 
not greater than one year.”  10 C.F.R. § 20.106(a) (1980).  
The District Court’s holding that Plaintiffs failed to show 
a genuine issue of material fact regarding duty was based 
on Plaintiffs’ failure to show a violation of § 20.106 
when averaged over the course of a year:  “Plaintiffs 
have pointed to no genuine issues of material fact that the 
annual average concentration of uranium effluent ever 
exceeded 1.7 x 10-2 microcuries/milliliter during the 
period 1957–1960, or that it ever exceeded 4.0 x 10-12 
microcuries/milliliter during the period 1961–1983.”  
McMunn, 131 F. Supp. 3d at 388.  On appeal, Plaintiffs 
continue to argue that they could show a violation based 
on a discharge that exceeds the maximum permissible 
concentration over any length of time.  Plaintiffs are 
plainly wrong. 
Plaintiffs’ argument is based entirely on the word 
“may” in the phrase “concentrations may be averaged 
over a period not greater than one year.”  They argue, 
“The term may is permissive, not mandatory.  There is no 
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requirement to take an average.”  Pls.’ Br. 43 (footnote 
omitted).  We agree with Plaintiffs that “may” is 
permissive.  See, e.g., Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of 
Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 650–51 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(comparing “the more flexible and permissive ‘may’” to 
“the mandatory ‘must’” (quoting Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 
F.3d 825, 831 n.6 (3d Cir. 1994))). 
But Plaintiffs’ reliance on a single word in that 
phrase ignores the fact that it is part of a sentence that 
speaks in the passive voice.  “Phrases constructed in the 
passive voice use an implied subject or actor who carries 
out the verb.”  Sci. Drilling Int’l, Inc. v. Pathfinder 
Energy Servs., Inc., No. H-06-1634, 2006 WL 2882863, 
at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2006).  Thus, the question is who 
has the discretion to decide whether to average annually.   
Given the context of the regulation, the obvious 
answer is that such discretion lies in the AEC because it 
is the entity charged with determining whether a licensee 
violates its regulatory duties.  Cf. United States v. 
Brumbaugh, 909 F.2d 289, 291 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The use 
of the passive voice in the statutory language requires us 
to infer a subject; the most logical inference is that the 
Attorney General, who has been charged with granting 
credit under section 3568 for over thirty years, is the 
intended subject of the sentence.”).  Plaintiffs’ unwritten 
assumption that the AEC intended for tort plaintiffs or 
district courts to have discretion to use annual averaging 
is mistaken.  Giving tort plaintiffs the power to determine 
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retroactively the period over which a violation is assessed 
“would allow [them] to fix the standard case by case and 
plant by plant.  An operator acting in the utmost good 
faith and diligence could still find itself liable for failing 
to meet such an elusive and undeterminable standard.”  
In re TMI, 67 F.3d at 1115.  Under § 20.106, Plaintiffs 
were required to show a breach using annual averaging.  
Their data relating to individual moments in time fails to 
show a breach. 
* * * 
Plaintiffs’ attempts to expand Defendants’ duty 
must fail.  The maximum permissible concentration is 
assessed at the boundary of the roof, the license 
requirement does not create a duty, and Plaintiffs must 
show that the maximal permissible concentration was 
exceeded when the emissions are averaged annually. 
II. BREACH 
The District Court held that Plaintiffs failed to 
show there was a dispute of fact as to whether 
Defendants emitted excessive radiation at the boundary 
of the roof because Plaintiffs failed to offer appropriate 
expert testimony.21  On appeal, Plaintiffs again rely 
                                           
 
21 See McMunn, 131 F. Supp. 3d at 389 (“In addition, to 
establish a breach of duty, Plaintiffs must offer evidence 
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almost entirely on data from the stacks and roof fans, 
which, as was established above, are legally irrelevant.  
See, e.g., Pls.’ Reply Br. 15–16 (“NUMEC officials were 
all too aware of the problem with the roof fans.”).  
Putting aside the stacks and fans data, we agree that 
Plaintiffs’ argument for breach fails for lack of expert 
evidence in this highly technical area.   
Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that they are “entitled” 
to “adverse inferences” that allow them to show a breach 
(and also causation).  See Pls.’ Br. 22.  This, too, fails 
because Plaintiffs did not show that the District Court 
abused its discretion in denying the adverse inference. 
A. Plaintiffs Needed Experts 
Plaintiffs failed to provide an expert who could 
testify that the data upon which they rely (stacks, vents, 
and readings from outside the facility) could show a 
violation of the maximum permissible concentration of 
uranium effluent at the boundary of the roof when 
averaged annually.   
Expert evidence is generally required when an 
issue is beyond the ken of a lay jury.  For instance, in a 
medical monitoring claim, we explained that the plaintiff 
                                                                                              
 
from a qualified expert that the Apollo facility’s 
emissions exceeded regulatory limits.”). 
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had to prove he or she suffered a “significantly increased 
risk of contracting a serious latent disease” and other 
factors “by competent expert testimony.”  Redland 
Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of Army of U.S., 55 F.3d 827, 
845–46, 852 (3d Cir. 1995).22  Similarly, then-Judge 
Sotomayor wrote for the Second Circuit that expert 
testimony would be “necessary” where “an injury has 
multiple potential etiologies.”  Wills v. Amerada Hess 
Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 46 (2d Cir. 2004).   
                                           
 
22 Cf. also Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 473 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (“In some situations in which the seriousness 
of injury or illness would be apparent to a lay person, 
expert testimony would not be required, e.g., a gunshot 
wound.  However, those circumstances are not present 
here.” (citation omitted)); Breidor v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 722 F.2d 1134, 1140–41 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that 
expert testimony was necessary to rebut the defendants’ 
contention in a products liability case); Lentino v. Fringe 
Emp. Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474, 480 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(“Expert testimony is required to establish the relevant 
standard and whether the defendant complied with that 
standard, except where the matter under investigation is 
so simple, and the lack of skill so obvious, as to be within 
the range of the ordinary experience and comprehension 
of non-professional persons.” (citations omitted) 
(Pennsylvania medical malpractice case)). 
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Perhaps recognizing their failure to transmute vent 
data into roof data, Plaintiffs try to borrow an “average 
dilution factor of 50” from an isolated 1968 document.  
See Pls.’ Br. 45.  But these kinds of calculations are best 
suited to experts—not lawyers or lay factfinders. 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 
Holding That Plaintiffs Were Not Entitled to an 
Inference Sufficient to Survive Summary Judgment 
Objecting to the report and recommendation, 
Plaintiffs argued that Defendants’ poor recordkeeping 
allowed them to request an inference under which a jury 
could assume that Defendants had breached the above-
described duty.  [See Dist. Ct. ECF No. 376, at 50–53.]  
By adopting the Magistrate Judge’s report and 
recommendation, the District Court rejected this 
argument.  See McMunn, 131 F. Sup. 3d 352. 
We review the District Court’s denial of the 
adverse inference for abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., In re 
Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc., 489 F.3d 568, 574 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (“We also review the [bankruptcy court’s] 
denial of UFP's motion seeking an evidentiary inference 
based on spoliation of evidence for abuse of discretion.”); 
Davis v. White, 858 F.3d 1155, 1160 (8th Cir. 2017) 
(“The district court’s refusal to sanction the officers with 
an adverse inference instruction was not an abuse of 
discretion.”). 
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Plaintiffs have failed to show that the District 
Court abused its discretion when determining that an 
adverse inference was not warranted here.23  Plaintiffs 
simply have not developed their argument sufficient to 
show an abuse of discretion.  [See Pls.’ Br. 21–22.]  In 
cases where this argument is more developed, an adverse 
inference may be appropriate.  See United States ex rel. 
Scutellaro v. Capitol Supply, Inc., No. 10-1094 (BAH), 
2017 WL 1422364, at *11 (D.D.C. Apr. 19, 2017) 
(noting several circuits have held that the failure to 
maintain records allows for an adverse inference).  This 
can be seen by analogy to spoliation cases.  In spoliation 
cases, where there is evidence that one party has 
destroyed or altered evidence, the opposing party can 
obtain a “‘spoliation inference,’ that the destroyed 
evidence would have been unfavorable to the position of 
the offending party.”  Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool 
Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1994).  Here, because 
                                           
 
23 Plaintiffs’ recordkeeping argument also relates to their 
failure to provide expert evidence relating to any 
individual Plaintiff’s exposure.  See, e.g., Pls.’ Reply Br. 
18 (“NUMEC’s failure to collect data makes calculations 
impossible—and it should not now benefit from its own 
malfeasances.”).  Plaintiffs have also failed to show the 
District Court abused its discretion when it denied an 
adverse inference with regard to causation.  See 
McMunn, 131 F. Supp. 3d at 394–96.  
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Plaintiffs failed to show an abuse of discretion, we need 
not analyze further. 
III. CAUSATION 
The District Court held that Plaintiffs’ case also 
must be dismissed because Plaintiffs’ experts failed to 
provide “evidence of [Plaintiffs’] exposure to inhaled 
uranium from the Apollo plant and an estimate of the 
dose they received which caused their cancers.”  
McMunn, 131 F. Supp. 3d at 399.  On appeal, Plaintiffs 
argue they showed causation even though they did not 
show a dose for any individual plaintiff because (1) 
Plaintiffs needed only to show “frequency, regularity, 
and proximity”—not dose—and (2) the law of the case 
requires us to assume that Melius’s testimony would be 
sufficient to show causation because the District Court 
ruled Melius’s testimony was admissible in its Daubert 
motion.  These arguments are unpersuasive because 
Plaintiffs’ experts failed to show that any of the 
individual Plaintiffs had sufficient exposure—looking at 
the frequency, regularity, and proximity to the 
radiation—and Plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the 
District Court’s inconsistent reasoning.   
A. Plaintiffs Do Not Show Sufficient Frequency, 
Regularity, and Proximity 
Unlike with duty and breach discussed above, 
causation for Price-Anderson public liability actions is 
evaluated under state law.  See In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1103, 
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1117 n.33 (3d Cir. 1995) (“As we have noted, the 1988 
Amendments retroactively required the applicable law 
for ‘public liability actions’ be ‘the law of the State in 
which the nuclear incident involved occurs, unless such 
law is inconsistent’ with federal law.”); see also In re 
Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1010 
(9th Cir. 2007) (“Under the PAA, Washington state law 
controls the standard of causation to be used in this 
case.”).  Here, that state law is Pennsylvania law. 
Pennsylvania requires a plaintiff to show that a 
defendant’s acts were a substantial factor in causing a 
plaintiff’s injury.  As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
recently stated, “To establish proximate causation, a 
plaintiff must adduce evidence to show that the 
defendant’s act was a substantial factor in bringing about 
the plaintiff’s harm.”  Rost v. Ford Motor Co., 151 A.3d 
1032, 1049 (Pa. 2016); see also Summers v. Certainteed 
Corp., 997 A.2d 1152, 1164–65 (Pa. 2010) (“[T]he 
requirements of proving substantial-factor causation 
remain the same.”). 
Until recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
had suggested that proving substantial-factor causation 
required showing the dose to which plaintiff was exposed 
because otherwise the “substantiality” of the substantial 
factor would not be shown to the jury.  See Betz v. 
Pneumo Abex LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 58 (Pa. 2012) 
(“Certainly a complete discounting of the substantiality 
  
56 
in exposure would be fundamentally inconsistent with 
Pennsylvania law.”).   
However, following oral argument in the case 
before us, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued its 
decision in an asbestos case, Rost v. Ford Motor Co.  In 
Rost, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court retreated from its 
earlier statements, emphasizing that it had previously 
“adopted the ‘frequency, regularity, and proximity’ test, 
as refined and applied by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Tragarz v. Keene 
Corp., 980 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1992).”  Rost, 151 A.3d at 
1043.   
It may well be that Rost applies only in 
mesothelioma cases because of unique public policy 
concerns about mesothelioma.24  Yet we need not decide 
                                           
 
24 See, e.g., Rost, 151 A.3d at 1042–43 (describing the 
“test on motions for summary judgment in mesothelioma 
cases”); id. at 1044 n.7 (“It is important to recognize that 
this Court settled on these principles based on a policy 
concern: that it is fundamentally unfair to hold a 
defendant jointly and severally liable for a mesothelioma 
plaintiff’s injuries for a de minimis contribution to the 
plaintiff’s overall exposure.”); id. at 1052 (stating that the 
frequency, regularity, and proximity test applied “for all 
exposures to asbestos”).  This makes particular sense to 
the extent that Rost relies on Tragarz, which, in turn is 
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based on an Illinois appellate court’s reliance on the 
nature of asbestos-related diseases:   
Given the various diseases which are 
associated with asbestos exposure, the 
medical evidence presented, the types of 
asbestos involved, the manner in which the 
products are handled, and the tendency of 
those asbestos products to release asbestos 
fibers into the air, the amount of evidence 
needed to establish the regularity and 
frequency of exposure will differ from case 
to case.  For example, none of the plaintiffs 
in this case were diagnosed with 
mesothelioma, an asbestos-related disease 
which is caused after only minor exposure to 
asbestos dust.   
Wehmeier v. UNR Indus., Inc., 572 N.E.2d 320, 337 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1991) (citation omitted).   
Mesothelioma is a “signature” disease relating to 
asbestos exposure; individuals do not usually develop 
mesothelioma without asbestos exposure.  See Daley v. 
A.W. Chesterton, 37 A.3d 1175, 1177 n.4 (Pa. 2012) 
(“Moreover, because mesothelioma, in general, is so rare, 
‘any case occurring after a well attested and substantial 
asbestos exposure is commonly accepted as being caused 
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by that exposure.’”); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer, 
736 S.E.2d 724, 728 (Va. 2013) (“Mesothelioma is a 
signature disease: it was uncontroverted at trial that the 
cause of mesothelioma is exposure to asbestos at some 
point during an individual's lifetime.”).   
By contrast, the cancers suffered by the Plaintiffs have 
numerous and sometimes even unknowable causes, as 
Melius conceded.  See JA3236 (“We're evaluating a 
disease that’s multi-causal.  We don’t have any way of 
testing the cancer to determine what caused it, what 
specific factor caused it.”); JA3237 (“There are many 
cancers that occur where we don’t identify the cause of 
that cancer or the causes of that cancer.”); JA3311 (“In 
an individual patient I think it’s more appropriate to use 
risk factors because it implies -- otherwise it implies that 
we know the factor that caused their specific individual 
cancer and in most cases we probably do not.”); see also 
Risk Factors for Cancer, Nat’l Cancer Institute, 
https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-
prevention/risk (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) (identifying 
age, alcohol, cancer-causing substances, chronic 
inflammation, diet, hormones, immunosuppression, 
infectious agents, obesity, radiation, sunlight, and 
tobacco as risk factors for cancer). 
Indeed, in 1999, we explained that establishing causation 
for a given cancer was extremely difficult.  See In re TMI 
  
59 
whether Rost is limited to mesothelioma cases because 
Plaintiffs’ evidence would not allow a jury to find 
sufficient frequency, proximity, and regularity.  Rost 
requires a plaintiff at summary judgment to have 
propounded “evidence that exposure to defendant’s 
asbestos-containing product was sufficiently ‘frequent, 
regular, and proximate’ to support a jury’s finding that 
defendant’s product was substantially causative of the 
disease.”  Rost, 151 A.3d at 1044 (emphasis added).  For 
                                                                                              
 
Litig., 193 F.3d at 643 (“Consequently, medical 
evaluation, by itself, can neither prove nor disprove that a 
specific malignancy was caused by a specific radiation 
exposure.”).  Modern secondary sources continue to 
agree with that assessment.  See, e.g., Steve C. Gold, 
When Certainty Dissolves into Probability: A Legal 
Vision of Toxic Causation for the Post-Genomic Era, 70 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 237, 279–81 (2013); William D. 
O’Connell, Note, Causation’s Nuclear Future: Applying 
Proportional Liability to the Price-Anderson Act, 64 
Duke L.J. 333, 357, 359 (2014) (“Radiation-protection 
scientists are in agreement that differential diagnosis 
cannot confidently identify the ultimate source of a 
plaintiff’s cancer.”); cf. Wilcox v. Homestake Mining Co., 
619 F.3d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[N]or do we see 
a basis for alternative liability where only one potential 
wrongdoer has been identified and the injury may simply 
have resulted from natural causes.”). 
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instance, the Rost Court noted that the plaintiff’s expert 
testified to more than three months of exposure “while 
noting studies showing that a single month of regular 
exposure to asbestos can double one’s likelihood of 
developing mesothelioma.”  Id. at 1046.  Even 
Lohrmann—the original frequency, regularity, and 
proximity case, which stated that the court was creating 
“a de minimis rule” for proving asbestosis causation 
under Maryland law—explained that “a plaintiff must 
prove more than a casual or minimum contact with the 
product.”  Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 
F.2d 1156, 1162 (4th Cir. 1986).  Here, where Plaintiffs 
(1) simply rely on the existence of any frequency, 
regularity, and proximity and (2) fail to offer any 
individualized evidence of exposure for any given 
Plaintiff, they come up short.  Even were this evidence 
substantively permissible under Pennsylvania law, it 
would fail to be admissible under Daubert for three 
reasons. 
First, Melius’s testimony is insufficient to create a 
genuine issue of fact regarding causation because it is 
nothing more than a radiation version of the 
impermissible “any breath” theory in Gregg v. V-J Auto 
Parts (the case in which that court first adopted the 
frequency, regularity, and proximity test in mesothelioma 
cases).  See Summers, 997 A.2d at 1161 n.14 (“In Gregg 
v. V-J Auto Parts, Co., 596 Pa. 274, 943 A.2d 216 
(2007), this Court recently rejected the viability of the 
‘each and every exposure’ or ‘any breath’ theory.”).  The 
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Gregg Court explained that, in a so-called “any breath” 
theory of asbestos exposure, a plaintiff alleges that “any 
exposure to asbestos, no matter how minimal, is a 
substantial contributing factor in asbestos disease.”  
Gregg v. V-J Auto Parts, Co., 943 A.2d 216, 226 (Pa. 
2007); see also Howard v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 78 A.3d 
605, 608 (Pa. 2013) (per curiam) (“Bare proof of some de 
minimus [sic] exposure to a defendant’s product is 
insufficient to establish substantial-factor causation for 
dose-responsive diseases.”).   
Melius assumes that anyone who lived in the area 
of the Apollo facility was exposed to a sufficient amount 
of radiation.  In Melius’s words, he “estimated that -- that 
they had a, um, substantial or significant exposure.”  
JA3227.  Yet he did not “estimate a specific or associate 
a specific level of exposure with a -- with those terms.”  
Id.  When asked about “significant exposure,” Melius 
agreed that “any exposure to a plaintiff that was above 
that plaintiff’s background would be a substantial 
exposure.”  JA3315.25  Similarly, Melius said that, 
                                           
 
25 This is in contradiction to, for instance, his admissions 
that he relied on different levels of cigarette usage to 
determine substantiality.  See JA3300, 3308; see also 
JA3321 (“For cigarette smoking and lung cancer, it is 
reduced to ten or twenty percent increased risk compared 
to somebody who has never smoked after a period of say 
twenty years, maybe even after ten or fifteen years.”). 
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“[d]epending on how you use the meaning of 
significant,” he “would say” one millirem above 
background was “substantial.”  JA3315–16.   
Second, Melius failed to offer individualized 
testimony as he was required to do for each Plaintiff.  For 
instance, in Howard v. A.W. Chesterton Co., the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained, “Relative to the 
testimony of an expert witness addressing substantial-
factor causation in a dose-responsive disease case, some 
reasoned, individualized assessment of a plaintiff’s or 
decedent’s exposure history is necessary.”  78 A.3d at 
608; cf. also Black v. M&W Gear Co., 269 F.3d 1220, 
1237–38 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a district court 
did not abuse its discretion in excluding an expert’s 
testimony when that expert “had not based his conclusion 
on the results of tests or calculations specific to” the 
plaintiff).  Although Melius describes each Plaintiff’s 
smoking history and a few other features for most 
Plaintiffs, Melius fails to offer any “reasoned . . . 
assessment” of any individual’s exposure to radiation 
from uranium effluent.  See, e.g., JA4782–84 (relying on 
reports about radiation released from the facility that do 
not show exposure to any of the individual Plaintiffs).  
He merely offers the conclusion that each Plaintiff’s 
“exposures to uranium and other radioactive materials 
released from the Apollo nuclear facility made a 
significant contribution to the development of” her or his 
cancer.  E.g., JA3448.  Even if such a conclusion were 
permissibly individualized, it would still be insufficient 
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to generate a genuine issue of fact because, under the 
Lone Pine order, only exposure to uranium is at issue 
here.   
Although Rost stresses that causation is an issue 
for the jury, we have never hesitated to grant summary 
judgment where one side fails to establish a genuine issue 
of fact concerning causation.  See, e.g., In re TMI Litig., 
193 F.3d 613, 722–23 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming summary 
judgment where plaintiff’s expert testimony “was 
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact” 
regarding causation); Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 
F.3d 146, 150 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[B]ecause the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the key 
elements of Heller’s experts’ testimony necessary to 
prove causation, the grant of summary judgment will be 
affirmed.”). 
Finally, the Federal Rules of Evidence impose a 
duty on a district judge to act as a gatekeeper of expert 
testimony even when considering elements of a cause of 
action derived from state law.  See Forrest v. Beloit 
Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 358 n.9 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining 
that “evidentiary issues in this case are governed by 
federal . . . law” while Pennsylvania substantive law 
affected what facts would be relevant); see also Hendrix 
ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., Inc., 609 F.3d 1183, 1193 
(11th Cir. 2010) (“Although the standards for finding 
causation are governed by Florida law, we apply federal 
law to determine whether the expert testimony proffered 
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to prove causation is sufficiently reliable to submit it to 
the jury.”); cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 
U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (“[A] gatekeeping role for the 
judge . . . is the balance that is struck by Rules of 
Evidence . . . .”). 
Thus, even assuming arguendo that Rost 
resuscitated “any breath” causation, Melius’s testimony 
would be too insubstantial to survive Daubert.  Melius’s 
testimony provides only a perfunctory narrative for each 
Plaintiff, and an unexplained conclusion that radiation 
was the cause, presumably because each Plaintiff was 
exposed to some radiation.  Such conclusory opinions of 
medical causation, even by qualified experts, are 
insufficient to establish causation of cancer by exposure 
to uranium effluent.  See Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 
620 F.3d 665, 671 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Whatever Dr. Carlini 
understood by ‘with a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty,’ the phrase—the conclusion by itself—does not 
make a causation opinion admissible.  The ‘ipse dixit of 
the expert’ alone is not sufficient to permit the admission 
of an opinion.” (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 
U.S. 136, 146 (1997))). 
Although we have held that an expert can offer an 
opinion “absent hard evidence of the level of exposure to 
the chemical in question,” we have only done so where 
an expert could rely “on the temporal relationship and the 
nature of the plaintiff’s complaints.”  Heller, 167 F.3d at 
157.  This, too, does not require a dose.  But it requires 
  
65 
more than an assumption about the effect of living within 
a mile of the Apollo facility. 
* * * 
Consider how a trial would unfold.  Plaintiffs 
would present a general causation expert who opines that 
any amount of ionizing radiation could cause cancer.  
Then, Plaintiffs would present Melius who would state 
that each of the Plaintiffs lived or worked near the Apollo 
facility and would therefore be assumed to have been 
exposed to some radiation from airborne uranium 
effluent from the Apollo facility.  Melius would then 
presumably testify that he is certain that the additional 
radiation specifically from the airborne uranium was a 
substantial factor in causing the cancer of each of the 
Plaintiffs.26  Finally, the jury would decide whether more 
than a dozen different illnesses suffered by more than 
seventy people were each caused by the radiation from 
the airborne uranium from the Apollo facility. 
How?  Without any ability to compare any 
plaintiff’s frequency, proximity, or regularity to any 
evidence showing that a given frequency, proximity, or 
regularity is correlated with any particular increase in 
                                           
 
26 Plaintiffs would also have to ensure they have 
sufficient testimony relating only to uranium effluent 
under the Lone Pine order. 
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risk—let alone the ability to perform the ideal 
comparison between dose and the dose-responsiveness of 
a given illness—the jury would be engaging in rank 
speculation. 
It is true that demanding more than evidence of 
“any exposure” makes it more burdensome for most 
plaintiffs to recover for injuries from radiation.  But the 
evidentiary regime that must apply in these cases 
necessarily requires that a jury find radiation was a 
substantial factor in causing a plaintiff’s injury—and 
requires, now, at summary judgment, that we be able to 
hold that a reasonable jury could so find.  See Gregg, 943 
A.2d at 225–26 (“We appreciate the difficulties facing 
plaintiffs in this and similar settings, where they have 
unquestionably suffered harm on account of a disease 
having a long latency period and must bear a burden of 
proving specific causation under prevailing Pennsylvania 
law which may be insurmountable.”); see also Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a).  We can demand no less. 
B. District Court Law of the Case Does Not Bind This 
Court, and, in Any Event, Plaintiffs Were Not 
Prejudiced 
Pointing to the inconsistency between the District 
Court’s Daubert opinion, which suggested Melius’s 
testimony was strong, and the District Court’s opinion 
granting summary judgment to Defendants, which held 
that Melius’s testimony did not create a genuine issue of 
material fact, Plaintiffs argue that the District Court was 
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bound to adhere to its Daubert opinion at summary 
judgment.  Such concerns are irrelevant where, as here, 
(a) this Court is not bound by the District Court’s 
Daubert opinion and (b) Plaintiff cannot show prejudice. 
Plaintiffs are correct that the District Court’s 
Daubert opinion appears to be inconsistent with its 
summary judgment opinion.  The Daubert opinion 
strongly implied that Melius’s testimony would be 
enough to get the case to the jury, holding that his 
testimony should not be excluded because there was 
“enough support in the record for the contention that the 
Plaintiffs’ exposure levels exceeded the normal 
background level.”  McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox 
Power Generation Grp., Nos. 2:10cv143 et al., 2014 WL 
814878, at *14 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2014).  By contrast, 
the District Court’s summary judgment opinion held that 
“Plaintiffs must provide . . . an estimate of the dose they 
received which caused their cancers.”  McMunn, 131 F. 
Supp. 3d at 399. 
But, as a general matter, we fail to see what 
difference law of the case makes at this stage of the 
litigation.  We are not bound by either of the District 
Court’s rulings, and we have addressed the Plaintiffs’ 
arguments on their own merits.  
At all events, Plaintiffs’ law-of-the-case argument 
fails on its own merits.  Two values animate law-of-the-
case doctrine: judicial economy and unfair prejudice.  
See, e.g., Roberts v. Ferman, 826 F.3d 117, 126 (3d Cir. 
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2016) (“We also have held that ‘the law of the case 
doctrine does not limit the power of trial judges to 
reconsider their prior decisions,’ but have noted that 
when a court does so, it must explain on the record why it 
is doing so and ‘take appropriate steps so that the parties 
are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling.’” 
(quoting Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 
1997))).   
Here, Plaintiffs have failed to show any prejudice 
from the District Court’s change in position.  Had the 
District Court ruled against them in its Daubert order, 
Plaintiffs’ case would have been dismissed as the 
Magistrate Judge recommended.  Plaintiffs would not 
have had an opportunity to create new expert reports in 
response to a Daubert ruling that more clearly reflected 
the District Court’s legal rulings on causation at 
summary judgment.   
Perhaps Plaintiffs could have argued that they 
were prejudiced because they were lulled into failing to 
challenge Defendants’ uncontested facts.  But, because 
we do not rely on any of those uncontested facts when we 
hold that Plaintiffs fail to show a genuine dispute of 
material fact with regard to causation, not even the 
admission of the uncontested facts demonstrates 
prejudice. 
* * * 
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Because Plaintiffs failed to offer evidence from 
which a jury could find that each plaintiff was exposed to 
radiation from Defendants’ uranium effluent sufficiently 
frequently, regularly, and proximately to substantially 
cause their illnesses, and further because the law-of-the-
case doctrine does not require us to conclude otherwise, 
we hold that Defendants have failed to demonstrate 
issues of material fact on causation. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law because Plaintiffs failed to show a genuine issue of 
material fact with regard to duty, breach, and causation.  
Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.   
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McMunn, et al. v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation 
Group, Inc., et al., No. 15-3506 
 
MCKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring, joined by RESTREPO, 
Circuit Judge.   
  
While I agree that summary judgment is appropriate here, 
I write to stress that the law in this area is simply inadequate 
to address claims arising under the Price-Anderson Act based 
on exposure to excess radiation.  
  
As the Majority explains, this is a Public Liability Action 
under the Price-Anderson Act.1  Federal law therefore 
controls our inquiry into whether Defendants owed Plaintiffs 
a duty, and if so, whether the duty was breached.  State law 
controls the inquiry into whether the breach, if proven, caused 
Plaintiffs’ injuries.2  As I will explain, existing law places an 
almost insurmountable burden on plaintiffs who try to recover 
under the Price-Anderson Act.  Under the existing law, 
Plaintiffs cannot establish causation, even if they have 
established that Defendants owed them a duty that was 
breached.  
  
Suits for injuries allegedly resulting from radiation 
exposure have no analogous counterpart in traditional tort 
law, and existing law ignores the unique problems inherent in 
claims based on exposure to “manmade” radiation.  As a 
result, plaintiffs will rarely, if ever, recover in these types of 
actions, and this will continue unless states (or Congress) 
recognize the unique problems endemic in proving that a 
plaintiff’s illness was proximately caused by exposure to 
radiation from a given facility or event.  
I. BREACH OF DUTY 
 I believe that Plaintiffs’ submissions (as itemized in 
the Majority Opinion) are more than adequate to survive 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to breach of 
duty.3  For example, an internal memorandum, dated 
                                              
1 Maj. Op. at 5.  
2 See In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1103, 1117 n.33 (3d Cir. 1995).  
3 See Maj. Op. at 10-12.  
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November 29, 1972, regarding NUMEC’s meeting with AEC 
Compliance stated:  
P. Nelson [AEC personnel] opened by 
explaining the purpose of the meeting.  He 
stated that Compliance was concerned about the 
recurring nature and seriousness of NUMEC 
violations.  He explained that the AEC could 
now impose civil penalties for those types of 
violations. . . .  NUMEC has been the worst 
offender of AEC regulations over the years. . 
. .  AEC had given NUMEC a grace period after 
the B&W takeover, but that little improvement 
was evident.  The AEC is strongly considering 
imposing civil penalties against NUMEC.4  
 
Another letter from the AEC stated: “It appears that certain of 
your activities were not conducted in full compliance with . . . 
and the requirements of the AEC’s ‘Standards for Protection 
Against Radiation,’ Part 20, and ‘Special Nuclear Material’ . . 
. .”5  Based on this, there could be enough evidence to support 
Plaintiffs’ claimed breach of duty.   
 
 The Majority affirms the District Court’s conclusion 
that much of Plaintiffs’ evidence is of either limited value or 
irrelevant because the only expert whose testimony survived 
the Daubert motion (Dr. Melius) primarily focused on 
radiation levels at the stacks or vents and not at the roof top 
boundary.6  Although I agree that Plaintiffs must establish the 
levels of radiation at the roof boundary rather than levels at 
the vents or stacks, levels at the vents or stacks could 
nevertheless be very relevant to establishing levels at the 
boundary if that evidence had been properly developed.   This 
follows from the fact that different radioactive substances 
have different half-lives.  I will not wade into the quantum 
mechanical weeds of half-lives here as that was discussed in 
some detail in our 1999 opinion in In re TMI Litigation (TMI 
II).7  Rather, I will merely note that half-lives vary from as 
short as less than a second to as long as many billions of 
                                              
4 JA4439-40 (emphasis added).  
5 JA4693. 
6 See Maj. Op. at 23, 29-34.  
7 193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999).  
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years, depending on the substance involved.8  Accordingly, if 
byproducts of the uranium produced at Defendants’ facility 
included substances with sufficiently long half-lives, their 
levels at the stacks and vents would be very relevant to 
determining exposure at the roof boundary and beyond.  A 
fact finder could readily conclude that the levels at the vents 
and stacks persisted with no discernable diminution (even 
after allowing for dilution as they dispersed into the 
surrounding community) long enough for residents of the 
community to be exposed to those levels.   The probative 
value of this evidence could be particularly compelling if the 
effluents that comprise the byproducts of uranium production 
are not otherwise found in the environment.  They would thus 
become much more analogous to toxins that cause diseases 
such as mesothelioma which I discuss in more detail below. 
 
 However, we do not know the extent to which 
byproducts of uranium production have an exceedingly short 
half-life or whether they have exceptionally low energies.  If 
they have a momentary short half-life or exceptionally low 
energies, their presence at the stacks and vents would be 
irrelevant to determining levels at the roof boundary.  This is 
because they would have disintegrated into sub particles 
before reaching the roof boundary and would likely not have 
had enough energy to cause any damage even if they reached 
the roof’s perimeter and beyond into the community.  
Plaintiffs did not offer any evidence that would allow a fact 
finder to conclude that the levels at vents and stacks persisted 
at the roof boundary.  Accordingly, evidence of the levels at 
the stacks and vents cannot satisfy their burden of 
establishing a breach at the relevant point—the roof 
boundary.  
 
 I also have reservations about the Majority’s 
conclusion that 10 C.F.R. § 20.106(a) requires averaging as 
opposed to merely allowing Plaintiffs to average exposure 
over a year.9  However, here again, Plaintiffs’ proof is 
deficient because they did not attempt to introduce any 
evidence about the actual content of the uranium effluent that 
was discharged.  If that effluent contained substances that 
                                              
8 See id. at 632. 
9 See Maj. Op. at 41-43. 
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were particularly toxic (such as plutonium), exposure to a 
given amount for a few days (perhaps even for a matter of 
hours) could cause cancer even though the exposure would 
appear minimal when averaged out over a year.10  There is an 
even more fundamental problem with Plaintiffs’ case that 
prevents them from surviving summary judgment, and that is 
why I feel compelled to write separately. 
 
 In order for Plaintiffs to succeed, they must do more 
than show a breach of a duty resulting in exposure to excess 
radiation.  They must show that the breach resulted in an 
exposure that proximately caused their injuries.  It is here that 
Plaintiffs’ claims fail regardless of the quality of all of their 
other proof.  Thus, even assuming a genuine issue of fact as 
to the exposure levels and Defendants’ breach, the evidence is 
still not sufficient to defeat summary judgment under the 
Price-Anderson Act because causation is lacking.  
II. CAUSATION 
A. The Problems of Radiation Toxicity  
 The Majority thoroughly and correctly explains 
causation as it applies to “toxic torts” under Pennsylvania 
law.  However, the legal principle of causation has evolved 
from suits arising from exposure to manmade toxic 
substances such as asbestos.  As the Majority notes, 
mesothelioma is caused by exposure to asbestos, and it is 
therefore a “signature” disease.  The disease almost never 
occurs absent exposure to asbestos.11  The problems of proof 
in such cases are quite similar to problems of causation in 
cases involving polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)12 or 
                                              
10 See George L. Voelz, Plutonium and Health: How Great is 
the Risk?, Los Alamos Sci. 83 (2000), 
https://fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/lanl/pubs/00818013.pdf; 
Katherine Harmon, Health Risk Fears Escalate as Japan 
Nuclear Plant’s Radioactive Release Remains Uncertain, Sci. 
Am. (Mar. 18, 2011), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/health-risk-
fukushima/ (“Plutonium is of graver concern because of its 
exceptionally long half-life (about 24,000 years) and its 
propensity to cause lung cancer if inhaled.”). 
11 Maj. Op. at 50-51. 
12 See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 
1994).  
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pneumoconiosis (black lung disease),13 to name but a few of 
the pathological byproducts of modernization.  In such cases, 
a pathology is caused by contact (usually ingestion) with a 
foreign substance that the injured person would not have 
otherwise been exposed to, or would have been exposed to 
only in relatively insignificant quantities, and that pathology 
almost never occurs in the absence of exposure to that toxic 
substance.  Accordingly, causation can be established by 
showing that defendant made (or controlled) a substance, 
plaintiff has a disease that almost never occurs absent contact 
with defendant’s substance, and plaintiff had sufficient 
contact with defendant’s product (i.e. “frequency, regularity, 
and proximity of exposure”) to allow a fact finder to conclude 
that the defendant’s product was a substantial factor in the 
plaintiff’s death or injury.14  Radiation is different. 
 
 In TMI II, we discussed the “scientific principles 
regarding the relationship between radiation and cancer.” 15  
As the Majority explains, “[m]anmade ionizing radiation can 
damage human cells.”16  An ion is nothing more than an 
electron that has been displaced from its orbit.17  Unlike with 
                                              
13 See Mancia v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 130 F.3d 579 (3d Cir. 1997). 
14 See Rost v. Ford Motor Co., 151 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2016). 
15 Maj. Op. at 13-15; see TMI II, 193 F.3d 613. 
16 Maj. Op. at 13 (citing TMI II, 193 F.3d at 639-40).  
Although we used the term “manmade” in TMI II, it is 
actually a misnomer that obscures some of the very important 
distinctions between environmental radiation naturally 
occurring and radiation from substances that are, in fact, 
manmade.  The latter radiation is not actually “manmade.”  It 
consists of natural elementary particles that are transformed 
by human activity.  The resulting radiation is nevertheless the 
result of quantum mechanical processes.  However, for the 
sake of convenience, we will also refer to this radiation as 
“manmade” as we did in TMI II. 
17 TMI II, 193 F.3d at 639 (“[A]n atom is ionized when an 
electron is ejected from its orbit and expelled from the 
atom.”).  It is actually a sweeping generalization to refer to all 
ionizing radiation as resulting from a single displaced 
electron.  A very detailed description of the process of 
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PCBs, asbestos or tobacco byproducts, we are constantly 
exposed to radiation on a daily basis.  We are exposed from 
numerous natural sources including the sun,18 or naturally 
occurring radioactive elements such as radon in the ground 
surrounding our homes.19  
 
  It is now beyond dispute that radiation can cause 
various types of cancer. However, unlike with asbestos and 
diseases, such as mesothelioma, radiation wreaks havoc with 
our bodies, not because it is a foreign substance (it is not), but 
because it transfers extra energy to our cells.  This energy 
can, in turn, damage our DNA in numerous ways that are 
described in detail in TMI II.20  
 
 Asbestos fibers cause mesothelioma by damaging the 
“mesothelial cells that control cell reproduction.  Some 
damaged cells die and tumor suppressor genes stop others 
                                                                                                     
ionization (including the all important Columb Force) can be 
found at TMI II, 193 F.3d at 632-38.    
 
      However, the complex distinctions are not important for 
purposes of this discussion. Therefore, rather than attempt 
more precision by distinguishing between the different types 
of ionizing particles and ionizing energy as we did in TMI II, 
we will refer to all ions as if they only consisted of electrons 
without attempting to distinguish between alpha, beta or 
gamma radiation or between orbital electrons and electrons 
created through nuclear reactions.  The important thing for 
purposes of this discussion is that “[w]hen a charged particle 
passes through matter, it excites and ionizes atoms in its 
path.”  Id. at 635.  This is what happens to human tissue that 
is exposed to radiation.  
18 Id. at 644-47. 
19 See Natural background radiation, Am. Cancer Soc’y, 
https://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancer-causes/radiation-
exposure/x-rays-gamma-rays/natural-background-
radiation.html (last revised Feb. 24, 2015) (explaining that 
radon is but one source of the background radiation that we 
are potentially exposed to on a daily basis and is listed only 
for purposes of illustration). 
20 See TMI II, 193 F.3d at 640. 
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from reproducing.”21  However, “[w]here suppressor genes do 
not stop the reproduction process, . . . the damaged cells 
divide, replicating the damage in the sister cells.”22  Over 
decades of continued growth of these cells, tumors develop.  
“This explains why mesothelioma has an extremely long 
latency period, as mesothelial cells have a very slow growth 
rate.”23  As expert testimony in a recent case from the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania established, “it is not 
scientifically possible to identify the particular exposure or 
exposures that caused a patient’s mesothelioma[.] . . .  
[I]nstead, the causative agent is ‘the series of exposures.’”24  
However, even though it is not possible to identify a 
particular exposure as causing a given occurrence of the 
disease, there is now no dispute that asbestos is responsible 
for mesothelioma. 
 
 Although the disease process described above for 
mesothelioma is quite similar to that which is triggered by 
radiation after the cell is irradiated, there is a key difference 
that is very relevant to our discussion.  As noted above, we do 
not normally develop diseases such as mesothelioma in the 
absence of exposure to the manmade carcinogens that can 
cause it.  Thus, if a plaintiff can produce evidence of 
sufficient frequency, regularity, and proximity of exposure to 
asbestos to establish that it is more likely than not that that 
exposure was a substantial cause of subsequent disease, the 
plaintiff then need only prove that defendant manufactured or 
controlled the substance that plaintiff had been exposed to in 
order to recover.  The same is true with any other “signature” 
disease. 
 
 Unlike products such as asbestos and PCBs, radiation 
is not a foreign substance. All of us are exposed to it every 
second of every day both inside of buildings and outdoors.  
Yet, radiation can “damage structures within the human body 
as cells are disrupted or killed by the ionizing radiation 
[energy] itself, and as energy is transferred to cells triggering 
                                              
21 Rost, 151 A.3d at 1039 (citations omitted). 
22 Id.  
23 Id. 
24 Id.  
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second-order chemical changes.”25 “Unlike a chemical 
product, which may be traceable to a particular manufacturer, 
different sources of radiation are not distinguishable, nor is 
there any noticeable difference between cancers caused by 
nuclear-power production and those caused by other sources 
of radiation.”26  
[M]edical evaluation, by itself, can neither 
prove nor disprove that a specific malignancy 
was caused by a specific radiation exposure [or 
series of exposures].  Therefore, the primary 
basis to link specific cancers with specific 
radiation exposures is data that has been 
collected regarding the increased frequency of 
malignancies following exposure to ionizing 
radiation.  In other words, causation can only be 
established (if at all) from epidemiological 
studies of populations exposed to ionizing 
radiation.27 
 
 However, epidemiological studies of exposed 
populations can only establish the percentage by which the 
incidence of given cancers in that population exceeds the rate 
for those same cancers in similar populations not exposed to 
the source of radiation.  No study can determine whether the 
cancer of a given member of that population was the result of 
exposure to a defendant’s product or to radiation released 
from a defendant’s facility.  As we explained in TMI II, “the 
task of establishing causation is greatly complicated by the 
reality that a given percentage of a defined population will 
contract cancer even absent any exposure to ionizing 
                                              
25 William D. O’Connell, Causation’s Nuclear Future: 
Applying Proportional Liability to the Price-Anderson Act, 64 
Duke L.J. 333, 348 (2014) [hereinafter O’Connell] (citing 
James E. Turner, Atoms, Radiation, and Radiation Protection 
421 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter Turner], available at 
http://nuclear.dababneh.com/Radiation-Undergrad-
2/Atoms,%20Radiation,%20and%20Radiation%20Protection.
pdf. 
26 Id. at 350 (citing Turner at 468).  
27 TMI II, 193 F.3d at 643 (citations omitted).  
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radiation.”28  This probability conundrum is even more of an 
issue when we try to compare members of a population who 
have only been exposed to natural radiation with members of 
the same population who have been exposed to that radiation 
plus radiation emanating from a defendant’s product or 
facility. 
 
 Plaintiffs who must prove that exposure to a particular 
source of radiation was a substantial cause of their injuries 
therefore face an insurmountable task that the law has yet to 
satisfactorily address.  The task is further complicated by the 
fact that radiation includes different kinds of particles (i.e. 
alpha, gamma, beta), each with different properties including 
different levels of energy and thus having a different 
capability of damaging human cells.29  As the NRC has 
explained:  
[N]atural radiation . . . is always present in the 
environment. It includes cosmic radiation which 
comes from the sun and stars, terrestrial 
radiation which comes from the Earth, 
and internal radiation which exists in all living 
things.  The typical average individual exposure 
in the United States from natural background 
sources is about 300 millirems per year.30 
 
Yet, although there is general scientific agreement that 
radiation can cause cancer, we are still at the rudimentary 
stages of understanding the etiology of cancers. 31  
 
 As if this does not make plaintiffs’ task in such cases 
difficult enough, two additional considerations further 
complicate inquiries into causation.  First, as has already been 
mentioned, not all radiation has the same energy level.  Some 
radiation can be filtered out by barriers no more substantial 
                                              
28 Id. at 643-44.  For a detailed explanation of the two major 
sources of natural radiation and average doses, see id. at 644-
48. 
29 For a detailed discussion of this, see id. 
30 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Background radiation, 
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-
ref/glossary/background-radiation.html. 
31 See TMI II, 193 F.3d at 644-48. 
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than sunscreen, or surface tissue, yet some radiation is 
capable of penetrating lead.32  Thus, mere proximity to a 
source of radiation does not necessarily establish a sufficient 
“absorbed dose” to link an individual’s illness to that 
proximity.33  This point is illustrated in the extreme by the 
fact that “[c]rews of nuclear submarines have possibly the 
lowest radiation exposure of anyone, despite living within a 
few meters of a nuclear reactor, since they are exposed to less 
natural background radiation than the rest of us [(the ocean 
shelters them)], and the reactor compartment is well 
shielded.”34  
 
 Second, the difficulty of linking a potentially 
radiation-related pathology to a defendant instead of to 
background radiation is made exponentially more difficult by 
the fact that some people have a genetic predisposition to 
diseases associated with radiation exposure, while others have 
a genetic composition that seems to protect them from the 
otherwise harmful effects of radiation.  Indeed, more than one 
physician has counseled that the best way to guard against 
contracting cancer is to “choose your parents carefully.”35  
Genetic research has even led researchers to conclude that: 
[P]erhaps a fortunate genetic endowment 
protects some lifelong smokers from lung 
cancer, while a genetic mischance induces lung 
cancer in some non-smokers.  Both 
environmental and genetic differences between 
individuals appear responsible for at least some 
                                              
32 See id. at 637 n.36. 
33Id. at 637 (“The absorbed energy per unit mass of material 
is termed the ‘absorbed dose.’”).  
34 World Nuclear Ass’n, Nuclear Radiation and Health 
Effects, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-
library/safety-and-security/radiation-and-health/nuclear-
radiation-and-health-effects.aspx. 
35 See, e.g., Huber R. Warner, If You Wish to Live a Long 
Time in Good Health, Choose Your Parents Carefully, 62A J. 
of Gerontology: Biological Scis. 575 (2007), available at 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17595411; see also 
Steve C. Gold, When Certainty Dissolves into Probability: A 
Legal Vision of Toxic Causation for the Post-Genomic Era, 
70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 237, 259 (2013) [hereinafter Gold].  
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of the variation in individuals’ responses to 
toxic exposures.  For the most part, it has been 
impossible (or at least impractical) to identify, 
quantify, and tease apart these possibilities 
using the investigatory tools of toxicology, 
environmental epidemiology, conventional 
biochemistry, and classical genetics.36 
 
Yet, Plaintiffs such as those here, must produce evidence that 
will establish that their injuries are more likely than not 
caused by effluents from Defendants’ uranium plant.  I 
simply do not see any way they can do that given the current 
state of the law. 
 
B. Congress’s Response to Causation Issues 
 
 Congress has recognized the problems inherent in 
attempting to prove causation in Public Liability Actions 
almost from the very beginning of our attempts to harness the 
power of the atom.  The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 created 
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to correct the 
deficiencies of the Price-Anderson Act, including the 
stringent burden of establishing causation.37  The Committee 
                                              
36 Gold at 258-59. 
37 Taylor Meehan, Lessons from the Price-Anderson Nuclear 
Industry Indemnity Act for Future Clean Energy 
Compensatory Models, 18 Conn. Ins. L.J. 339, 346 (2012) 
[hereinafter Meehan]; see also Michael Flynn, A Debt Long 
Overdue, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41-42 (2001) (The 
Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Act 
acknowledged that “nuclear weapons workers were put at risk 
building the country’s arsenal.”  Acknowledging the 
difficulties associated with establishing causation, and 
“[b]ecause the government failed to adequately track 
exposures at these sites, [the Act] assumes that workers’ 
cancers are work related, thus relieving the workers of the 
near-impossible task of having to prove the connection.”  
Further, the Act “establishes the possibility that other sites 
and illnesses may be added to the cohort at a later date.”); see 
also David Rocchio, The Price-Anderson Act: Allocation of 
the Extraordinary Risk of Nuclear Generated Electricity: A 
Model Punitive Damage Provision, 14 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. 
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was also concerned with state statutes of limitation that could 
nullify meritorious claims because of the latency of injuries 
caused by radiation.38  Consequently, the 1966 amendments 
to the Act included a provision for the waiver of various 
defenses under state tort law in the event of an “extraordinary 
nuclear occurrence.”39  An “extraordinary nuclear occurrence” 
was defined as:  
[A]ny event causing a discharge or dispersal of . 
. . byproduct material from its intended place of 
confinement in amounts offsite, . . . which the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the 
Secretary of Energy. . . determines to be 
substantial, and which the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission or the Secretary of Energy. . . 
determines has resulted or will probably result 
in substantial damages to persons offsite . . ..40 
 
“This provision was enacted in order to assure that the 
victim’s entitlement to compensation would be determined 
under a strict liability standard, instead of the negligence 
standard that most state courts require.”41  The amendments 
also included a provision that waived state statutes of 
limitation that were more limited than the three-year limit 
established under the Price-Anderson Act.42  However, the 
overarching problem of causation was not impacted by 
attempts to augment statutes of limitation or impose strict 
                                                                                                     
Rev. 521, 538-39 (1987) [hereinafter Rocchio] (citing 
Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on 
Proposed Amendments to the Price-Anderson Act Relating to 
Waiver of Defenses, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 105-07 (1966), 
available at 
https://www.loc.gov/resource/conghear08.00170174379/?sp=
10).    
38 Rocchio at 539. 
3942 U.S.C. § 2014(j). 
40 Id. 
41 Meehan at 347. 
42 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1)(F)(iii) (The Act allows “any 
issue or defense based on any statute of limitations if suit is 
instituted within three years from the date on which the 
claimant first knew, or reasonably could have known, of his 
injury or damage and the cause thereof.”). 
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liability.  In either case, a plaintiff would still have to 
establish that a given pathology was caused by exposure to a 
defendant’s radiation rather than background radiation, 
heredity or some other factor.  Accordingly, this legislative 
effort was only helpful in the exceedingly rare cases where 
that evidentiary gap could be bridged.  
 
 In 1988, Congress created the Presidential 
Commission on Catastrophic Nuclear Accidents to “conduct a 
comprehensive study of appropriate means of fully 
compensating victims of a catastrophic nuclear accident that 
exceeds the aggregate public liability . . . in the statute . . . .”43  
In its final report to Congress, the Commission “sought to 
identify the ‘next best’ approach, since attaining the ‘best’ 
solution, compensating only those whose cancers or other 
latent illnesses were caused by the accident, is not currently 
possible.”44  The options included:  
Option A, relaxing traditional 
notions of proof of causation and 
paying something to everyone 
who gets cancer; Option B, 
retaining and rigorously applying 
traditional standards, which would 
result in paying few, if any, 
claims; and Option C, adopting 
some proxy for direct proof of 
causation, such as imputing group 
risk to individuals who actually 
develop cancer and paying those 
claims where the association 
between radiation exposure and a 
particular cancer is the strongest 
(or at least at some minimum 
level), with the option, where a 
strong association is required for a 
“full” award, of also paying lesser 
                                              
43 Presidential Comm’n on Catastrophic Nuclear Accidents, 
Report to the Congress from the Presidential Commission on 
Catastrophic Nuclear Accidents, Letter to the Senate (August 
1990) [hereinafter Report], available at 
http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/news/rpccna/pcrcna02.htm.  
44 Id. at ch. 4.IV.B.  
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amounts on those claims with a 
somewhat weaker association.45 
 
The Commission ultimately recommended Option C46 and 
provided three possible ways to implement that Option, while 
noting that better techniques can be developed in the future: 47   
The first would pay the full 
amount for any diagnosed cancer 
where the probability of causation 
(PC) is .5 or greater, and a 
declining amount down to a cutoff 
of PC = .2, at which compensation 
would be 20 percent of the full 
award, determined in accordance 
with Chapter 3. 
 
The second variation would pay 
the full amount for any diagnosed 
cancer where the PC is .5 or 
greater, and a declining amount 
down to a PC of .2, at which 
compensation would be 30 
percent of a full award. 
The third variation, which is most 
like Option A, above, would 
simply pay a benefit to anyone in 
the affected area with a diagnosed 
cancer whose radiation exposure 
indicated a PC of 20 percent or 
greater. Congress might elect to 
make this a full award determined 
in accordance with Chapter 3, or a 
fixed dollar amount, or 
reimbursement for actual medical 
expenses.48  
 
                                              
45 Id.  
46 This option is known as the “probability of causation” rule.  
47 Report at ch. 4.II. 
48 Id. at ch. 4.IV.B. (citation omitted).  
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Courts have adopted variations of these and other options as 
discussed below.  However, despite these efforts, the problem 
of establishing causation in these suits remains because we 
continue to approach such claims the same way we approach 
injuries resulting from asbestos, defective brakes, holes in 
pavement, and falls in the aisles of the neighborhood 
supermarket.  
 
C. Evolving Case Law: Relaxing Standards 
 
 Some courts have responded by implementing a more 
relaxed analytical framework for these suits.  None of these 
approaches has yet won general acceptance, and each 
contains certain flaws.49  
 
1. The Preponderance Rule 
 
The preponderance rule is very similar to the typical 
preponderance of the evidence burden.  It requires a plaintiff 
to prove that the defendant’s activity was more likely than not 
either the but-for causation or a substantial factor in causing 
the plaintiff’s injuries.50  Courts have equated the “more 
                                              
49 The following discussion of evolving law is not intended as 
an exhaustive survey. Rather, I mention it only to offer 
additional examples of the problem and some solutions that 
have been suggested. 
50 Shelly Brinker, Opening the Door to the Indeterminate 
Plaintiff: An Analysis of the Causation Barriers Facing 
Environmental Toxic Tort Plaintiffs, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1289, 
1303-04 (1999) [hereinafter Brinker]; see Sterling v. Velsicol 
Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1201 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(“Whereas numerous jurisdictions have rejected medical 
experts’ conclusions based upon a ‘probability,’ a 
‘likelihood,’ and an opinion that something is ‘more likely 
than not’ as insufficient medical proof, the Tennessee courts 
have adopted a far less stringent standard of proof and have 
required only that the plaintiffs prove a causal connection 
between their injuries and the defendant’s tortious conduct by 
a preponderance of the evidence. While, in accordance with 
Tennessee common law, plaintiffs’ proof by a reasonable 
medical certainty requires them only to establish that their 
particular injuries more likely than not were caused by 
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likely than not” element of this rule to a level of certainty 
greater than 50%.51 The preponderance rule does not reduce a 
plaintiff’s burden of showing cause-in-fact, it allows the 
plaintiff to present individualized and statistical evidence to 
establish that the defendant’s activities were likely a 
substantial contributor to plaintiff’s injury.52   
 
Because of the 50% threshold requirement, plaintiffs 
who cannot demonstrate a greater than 50% likelihood that 
the defendant caused their injuries do not recover anything.  
However, if plaintiffs are able to show, for example, that 
defendant is responsible for causing injuries to 51% of the 
exposed population, every plaintiff recovers even though the 
evidence only proved that 51% of the individuals in the 
exposed population suffered injuries because of defendant’s 
activities.   
 
This is basically the way causation is now determined 
in Pennsylvania, as explained in the Majority’s discussion of 
Rost v. Ford Motor Co.,53 except that it allows group recovery 
if any group member of the group is successful in showing 
his/her disease was proximately caused (i.e. by a 51% 
probability) by a defendant.  
 
There are several obvious problems with this 
approach.  As we have explained above, because everyone in 
                                                                                                     
ingesting the contaminated water, their proofs may be neither 
speculative nor conjectural.”). 
51 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 
835-37 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d sub nom. In re Agent Orange 
Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(quoting Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 
506, 516 (5th Cir. 1984), on reh'g, 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 
1985)) (The rule provides an “‘all or nothing’ approach, 
whereby [assuming all other elements of the cause of action 
are proven], the plaintiff becomes entitled to full 
compensation for those . . . damages that are proved to be 
‘probable’ (a greater than 50 percent chance), but is not 
entitled to any compensation if the proof does not establish a 
greater than 50 percent chance.”). 
52 Id. at 835. 
53 See Maj. Op. at 49-52 (citing Rost, 151 A.3d 1032).  
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the population will have been exposed to radiation during 
their lifetime, and since it is not yet possible to isolate the 
effect of radiation from a particular source, the same 
problems of causation remain.  This approach merely 
suspends proof of causation for everyone else if anyone in the 
group can prove causation.  All recover based on the showing 
that someone should recover.  However the nearly impossible 
burden of proving causation remains.   Moreover, if the 
burden can somehow be satisfied by any one plaintiff or a 
subset of plaintiffs, the result imposes “crushing liability” on 
defendants that could negatively impact some efforts to find 
alternative energy sources.54  In addition, this approach 
allows plaintiffs whose injury is probably genetic or due to 
background radiation to recover along with those who can 
trace their injury to the disputed source.  But, the fact that one 
or more plaintiffs in a given population have been injured by 
exposure to a given source certainly does not mean that 
everyone in that population has been.  Yet, everyone would 
ride along on the claims of those who can show a defendant 
proximately caused his/her injury.  
 
2. The Proportionality Rule 
 
Alternatively, some courts have used the 
proportionality rule.  This rule presumes causation when a 
plaintiff presents statistical evidence showing that it is likely 
that a defendant’s activities caused an injury to a proportion 
of the individuals in the exposed population.55  This approach 
may, at first, also appear to resemble Pennsylvania’s 
“frequency, regularity and proximity” test.  However, under a 
pure implementation of this proportionality rule, plaintiffs are 
not required to present individualized proof.  For example, if 
100 plaintiffs alleged that defendant’s disposal of hazardous 
wastes caused their injury and the risk of developing such 
injury in the exposed population is 55%, then every plaintiff 
will recover 55%.56  However, plaintiffs will likely never 
                                              
54 Brinker at 1309-10. 
55 Id. at 1313.  
56 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980); see 
Cottle v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882, 905 (Ct. App. 
1992) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (“Instead of choosing between 
the extremes of overcompensation and no compensation at all 
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obtain complete recovery under such a tort regime.57  In 
addition, this rule still allows plaintiffs whose injuries or 
deaths were likely attributable primarily to background 
radiation or genetics (or a combination of the two) to recover.  
 
3. The Allen Rule 
   
 The United States District Court for the District of Utah 
presented another option in Allen v. United States, which 
involved a dispute arising from atmospheric testing.  That 
court resorted to burden shifting. A rebuttable presumption of 
liability arises if a plaintiff can show a correlation between 
his or her injuries and the increased risk resulting from a 
defendant’s negligent release of radiation.  The problem here 
is that correlation is not the same as causation.58  Yet, using 
this approach, Allen held that 
[w]here a defendant who negligently creates a 
radiological hazard which puts an identifiable 
population group at increased risk, and a 
member of that group at risk develops a 
biological condition which is consistent with 
having been caused by the hazard to which he 
has been negligently subjected, such 
consistency having been demonstrated by 
                                                                                                     
this solution allows plaintiffs to recover a percentage of their 
damages from those responsible for their exposure to the 
toxic.  Under this formula defendants responsible for the toxic 
exposure are liable to all those who were exposed and later 
suffered injury—including those who may have suffered the 
injury even if they had never come near the toxic 
substance. But defendants are only liable for a percentage of 
plaintiffs’ damages equal to the degree this exposure 
increased plaintiffs’ risk of injury.  For example, assume a 
chemical increases the risk of cancer by 15 percent among 
those exposed to the toxin.  All exposed to this chemical who 
later came down with cancer would be entitled to recover 15 
percent of their total damages from those responsible for the 
exposure.”). 
57 Brinker at 1318 (citation omitted).  
58 For example, the height of males and females correlates to 
whether they play professional basketball.  However, playing 
professional basketball does not cause players to grow taller.  
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substantial, appropriate, persuasive and 
connecting factors, a fact finder may reasonably 
conclude that the hazard caused the condition 
absent persuasive proof to the contrary offered 
by the defendant.59 
 
 In undertaking this inquiry, the fact finder considers 
the following non-exhaustive list of factors: 
(1) the probability that plaintiff was exposed to 
ionizing radiation due to nuclear fallout from 
atmospheric testing at the . . . Test Site at rates 
in excess of natural background radiation; (2) 
that plaintiff's injury is of a type consistent with 
those known to be caused by exposure to 
radiation; and (3) that plaintiff resided in 
geographical proximity to the . . . Test Site . . . . 
Other factual connections may include but are 
not limited to such things as time and extent of 
exposure to fallout, radiation sensitivity factors 
such as age or special sensitivities of the 
afflicted organ or tissue, retroactive internal or 
external dose estimation by current researchers, 
a latency period consistent with a radiation 
etiology, or an observed statistical incidence of 
the alleged injury greater than the expected 
incidence in the same population.60 
                                              
59 Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 415 (D. Utah 
1984), rev’d on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 
1987). 
60 Id.; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433 (1965) 
(“The following considerations are in themselves or in 
combination with one another important in determining 
whether the [defendant’s] conduct is a substantial factor in 
bringing about harm to another: (a) the number of other 
factors which contribute in producing the harm and the extent 
of the effect which they have in producing it; (b) whether the 
actor’s conduct has created a force or series of forces which 
are in continuous and active operation up to the time of the 
harm, or has created a situation harmless unless acted upon by 
other forces for which the actor is not responsible; (c) lapse of 
time.”); see also O’Connell (proposing a species of 
proportionality tests that allows compensation based upon 
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The problem here is that because this rule presents several 
factors that courts can consider, consistency may be elusive 
and courts addressing substantially identical circumstances 
may reach different results.  Nevertheless, this approach 
appears to be the most promising and the most consistent with 
the realities of the risk created by an activity that can expose a 
population to radiation.  It may be that the only realistic 
approach is to compensate an identified population for the 
increased risk occasioned by a given activity.  I do not, 
however, suggest that such nagging questions as the amount 
of that compensation, identifying the population that is at 
increased risk, or countless other factors lend themselves to 
easy or equitable resolution. 
 
None of these approaches have yet gained wide 
acceptance and, as should be evident from this discussion, 
none of these approaches is close to perfect.  Rather, they are 
sorely needed attempts to adopt (or augment) the traditional 
rules requiring a direct and linear cause-in-fact relationship 
with no intervening causes, to the reality of exposure to 
ionizing radiation resulting from human activities.  
 
III. CONCLUSION 
  
For reasons I have explained, my concerns about some 
of the District Court’s rulings are not sufficient to cause me to 
conclude that the court erred in granting summary judgment 
against these Plaintiffs and dismissing the complaint.  
Problems with the Plaintiffs’ proof (and lack thereof) and the 
Herculean task of trying to produce enough evidence to get to 
a fact finder on the issue of causation are simply too 
formidable for these claims to survive.   
  
As I have explained, this will almost always be the 
case until state supreme courts, state legislatures and/or 
Congress devise a way to more fairly address the very real 
and substantial dangers posed by activities that increase the 
risk of exposing communities to ionizing radiation.  However, 
                                                                                                     
increased risk once that risk exceeds a certain threshold. The 
threshold is, of course, a policy matter and can be determined 
by legislatures after hearings on this issue.). 
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since that day is not yet here, I agree that Defendants were 
entitled to summary judgment.  I can only hope that the dues 
that we pay for the comforts of living in the atomic age will 
one day not require us to forego remedies for the harmful 
effects of the nuclear byproducts of that modernization, which 
we are still trying to understand.  
